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CORPORATIONS AND THE MARKET 
FOR LAW 
Larry E. Ribstein* 
Erin Ann O’Hara** 
The state competition for corporate law has long been studied as 
a distinct phenomenon. Under the traditional view, corporations are 
subject to a unique choice-of-law rule, the “internal affairs doctrine” 
(IAD).  This rule is explained as a historical accident, or by the spe-
cial logistics of the corporate contract.  The resulting market for cor-
porate law appears to have special characteristics, particularly includ-
ing the dominance of the single state of Delaware.  This article 
challenges the traditional view.  It shows that the corporate law mar-
ket is best understood as a special application of the general market 
for law.  Parties to many types of contractual relationships are able to 
choose the law they wish to govern their relationship, and states com-
pete to provide the law that the parties most desire.  Any differences 
between the corporate and general law markets are matters of degree 
rather than kind and are explained by applying the general forces un-
derlying the law market to particular sets of circumstances.  Theories 
of corporate competition that ignore the broader law market context 
are incomplete, and the competition for corporate law carries lessons 
for the law market generally.  Moreover, the connection between the 
corporate and other law markets has implications for the constitu-
tional status of the IAD, the scope of the IAD, and for the relation-
ship between state and federal law. 
In 1974 William Cary popularized the notion that there was a mar-
ket for corporate law.  In that market, corporations could choose among 
states as places of incorporation, and Delaware became the dominant 
competitor in the provision of corporate laws.1  Cary also asserted that 
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because managers choose the place of incorporation, state corporate law, 
especially Delaware law, gives managers too much power and preroga-
tive within their firms.2  Cary’s characterization of this market as a “race 
to the bottom” is controversial, and the debate it sparked has important 
implications for the regulation of corporate governance.  Numerous 
scholars have joined Cary in examining the nature of the market for cor-
porate law and the extent to which Delaware dominates this market.3 
While examining the corporate law market, scholars have largely 
ignored the fact that this market for law coexists with markets for many 
other types of law.  The corporate law market seems unique because its 
source is found in a special rule, the “internal affairs doctrine” (IAD), 
which holds that the law of the state of incorporation governs the rela-
tionship between the managers, the shareholders, and the corporation.4  
Corporations can choose their place of incorporation without having any 
other connection with the state of incorporation.  This contrasts with the 
rule applicable to other contracts, as summarized in the Restatement 
(Second) of Conflicts, which conditions enforcement of contractual 
choice-of-law clauses on the parties’ connection to the state whose law is 
chosen.5  The contrast between the rules is apparent in Judge Posner’s 
opinion in Curtis 1000 Inc. v. Suess,6 which rejected the choice of Dela-
ware law, the employer’s state of incorporation, as applied to the non-
competition clause in an employee’s contract with his firm.7  The firm 
was not entitled to rely on Delaware law because Delaware lacked a suf-
ficient connection to the contract, even though, as Posner pointed out, 
the choice of Delaware law would have been perfectly acceptable for the 
corporation’s internal affairs despite the shareholders’ lack of connection 
to Delaware.8 
Because of the IAD, states can compete to supply corporate law 
separate from tax law, regulatory law, or other benefits.  To obtain tax 
and other benefits in a particular state, a corporation might need to lo-
cate a plant or other assets in that particular state.  By incorporating in a 
different state, the corporation can choose among the particular benefi-
cial aspects of each state’s laws.  Without the IAD, the corporation 
would be forced to choose a single state’s bundle of laws, including cor-
porate, tax, and regulatory law. 
Commentators have given at least two explanations for this appar-
ently special treatment of corporations under the IAD.  First, in their 
 
 2. Id. at 697–99. 
 3. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 4. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 304, 307 (1971).  Other rules recog-
nize the application of the law of the state of incorporation concerning particular matters.  See id. § 296 
(requirements for incorporation); id. § 297 (states’ recognition of foreign incorporations); id. § 303 
(determination of who is shareholder); id. § 306 (liability of majority shareholder). 
 5. See id. § 187(2). 
 6. 24 F.3d 941 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 7. Id. at 948–49. 
 8. Id. 
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early history in the United States, corporations had to be created by spe-
cial act of the state legislature, which provided for special state privileges 
and concessions.9  Because corporations were “creatures” of the state 
that created them,10 the IAD had strong legal traction.  Indeed, the ques-
tion of which law to apply to the governance of a corporation never arose 
as it did for other contracts.11 
Second, there seems to be compelling practical reasons for ensuring 
that only one lawmaking body can determine a firm’s governance and fi-
nancial rights.12  If, for example, California required one method of vot-
ing for directors while New York required another for the directors of 
the same company, the operations of the firm would be hampered. 
Given its distinct origins and justification, it is not surprising that 
the corporate law market appears different from the markets for other 
types of law.  This market seems to be dominated by a single supplier, 
Delaware.  This market structure seems attributable not only to the IAD, 
but also to the sizable franchise fee Delaware is able to collect for the 
privilege of using its law.  Numerous scholars have examined this phe-
nomenon and its implications for the efficiency of corporate law.13 
The apparent distinctiveness of the corporate law market and the 
IAD has legal implications.  First, the contrast between the IAD and the 
general rule on enforcing contractual choice of law suggests that the cor-
poration is something other than a mere contract.  Incorporating states 
therefore seem to have special regulatory powers over corporations to 
balance the special privilege the IAD confers.  Second, the special treat-
ment of corporations suggests that the IAD has constitutional status.  To 
the extent that the rule stems from special state involvement in corpora-
tions, a state court’s application of the law of a nonincorporating state 
seems a serious breach of the comity that states owe each others’ laws.  A 
state’s intricate involvement in “its” firms seems to demand the applica-
tion of only that state’s law to its firms even when transacting business in 
a national economy, and to privilege state rather than federal regulation 
of the internal affairs of the firms. 
On closer examination, however, the uniqueness of the corporate 
law market starts to fade.  A corporation is basically a set of contracts 
among and between many parties, including creditors, shareholders, em-
ployees, and directors.14  These contract rules specify (1) the rights of 
 
 9. See Frederick Tung, Before Competition: Origins of the Internal Affairs Doctrine, 32 J. CORP. 
L. 33, 44–45 (2006). 
 10. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Constitutional Conception of the Corporation, 4 SUP. CT. ECON. 
REV. 95, 98 (1995). 
 11. Id. at 99. 
 12. See, e.g., EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 23.4 (2d ed. 1992) (ex-
pressing view that IAD is “practically a necessary rule” in order to promote uniformity of sharehold-
ers’ rights and duties). 
 13. See infra Part IV.A. 
 14. For a discussion of the arguments for and against the contractual theory of the corporation, 
see Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-
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some of these parties to share the contract’s benefits and burdens (i.e., 
profits and losses), (2) the allocation of power to make decisions that 
bind members of the corporation, and (3) the processes by which these 
decisions are made.  One might question, therefore, whether corpora-
tions should get a different choice-of-law rule from that applied to other 
contracts.  After all, firms that sell insurance, franchises, or anything on 
the Internet somehow cope with imperfectly enforced choice-of-law 
clauses despite similar difficulties customizing contracts for buyers in dif-
ferent states. 
To be sure, public corporations present unique problems.  It is im-
possible to give thousands of shareholders different financial and voting 
rights according to where they reside.  The market could not possibly 
price shares under these conditions.  But these problems imply only that 
one rule needs to apply to a corporation’s governance, which could be 
the law of the corporation’s base of operations and not necessarily the 
law chosen by the firm.15  A base-of-operations rule might lead to a dif-
ferent sort of market for corporate law, but it would not necessarily be 
unworkable. 
The claim that the IAD derives from the special nature of the cor-
poration must rest on the IAD’s basis in the state-creation theory of the 
corporation.16  In other words, once having characterized corporations as 
creatures of state law, the choice-of-law rule the courts applied to corpo-
rations naturally followed.  From this standpoint, the IAD has little to do 
with the rest of the choice-of-law universe. 
There are several problems with this historically based “corporate 
exceptionalism” approach.  First, corporations long ago broke from their 
origins as concessions or franchises and became more like ordinary con-
tracts.17  Thus, in order to adhere to the IAD, courts had to ignore the 
widening gap between theory and reality. 
Second, even if courts were reluctant to abandon this legal theory, 
legislatures were free to make the policy judgment that it was more im-
portant to protect their regulatory prerogatives than to adhere to an an-
cient concept of the corporation.  Thus, once corporate operations began 
to expand beyond the state of incorporation, legislatures in the states in 
which they transacted business could have decreed that local corporate 
law would apply to disputes that involved their citizens. 
Third, something like the IAD has been applied far beyond the cor-
porate sphere.  It applies to partnerships and other business associations 
 
Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 7–18 (1990).  For an application of the contractual theory of the 
corporation to choice of law, see Larry E. Ribstein, Choosing Law By Contract, 18 J. CORP. L. 245 
(1993). 
 15. In Europe, for example, most countries apply the law of the seat of the corporation.  See in-
fra Part IV.D. 
 16. See supra text accompanying notes 9–10. 
 17. See infra Part II.A. 
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that traditionally have not been regarded as state creations.18  If the IAD 
can be applied to what is essentially a contract among individual mem-
bers or partners of an unincorporated business association, why not to 
the contracts forming other long-term business relationships such as 
franchises?  Principles similar to the IAD have been applied to many 
types of conventional commercial contracts.19  Although the general rule 
for contractual choice of law contemplates significant limits on party 
choice, in practice choice-of-law clauses in conventional contracts are 
very generally enforced.  Moreover, something like the IAD has been 
applied to trusts,20 and, more recently, to European corporations, which 
have been governed by the “real seat” choice-of-law rule.21 
In general, we show that the market for corporate law is best under-
stood as part of a general market for laws that exists for many different 
types of contracts.  Our main contribution is to argue that similar politi-
cal forces and economic incentives underlie all of these markets.  Any 
differences among these markets and in the rules governing them can be 
explained by the differing specific market forces and the relative balance 
of power of competing political groups affected by the market forces.  
Both for corporations and for other contracts, the market is driven by 
parties’ ability to move among jurisdictions and those jurisdictions’ in-
centives to compete for people, firms, and litigation.  This broader per-
spective on law markets enables us to better understand both the market 
for corporate law and the market for other law.  Moreover, this new per-
spective enables a richer understanding of the processes underlying ju-
risdictional competition and its role in disciplining states’ and nations’ 
creation of law.  The focus on the market for corporate law has simply 
revealed one manifestation of deeper phenomena. 
Placing the market for corporate law in its broader context also has 
significant implications for the legal treatment of corporate and contract 
law issues.  First, the non-uniqueness of the corporate law market un-
dermines arguments that the IAD should be subject to constitutional 
protection, because the new analysis shows how both the corporate and 
the general law market have managed to thrive without such protection.  
Moreover, if the IAD is, indeed, fundamentally just another contractual 
choice-of-law rule, any constitutional protection of the IAD would have 
to distinguish rules for other contracts.  In other words, if the Supreme 
Court is prepared to hold that it is unconstitutional for California to 
regulate the contract governing the thousands of shareholders of a Dela-
ware corporation, it must be prepared to explain why California law 
should be able to regulate the contract governing the thousands of Cali-
 
 18. See infra Part IV.B–C. 
 19. See infra Part IV.F. 
 20. See infra Part IV.G. 
 21. See infra Part IV.D. 
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fornia employees who are working under a Delaware employment con-
tract. 
Second, this article’s analysis helps to settle current controversies 
regarding the appropriate scope of state and federal corporate law and 
the states’ application of the IAD.  May the federal government regulate 
corporate governance just as it does securities trading?  May California 
regulate insider trading in a Delaware corporation on behalf of Califor-
nia shareholders?  If the corporate law market and the IAD are funda-
mentally related to the general law market and rules governing choice-
of-law clauses for other contracts, then the answer to both questions is 
yes.  If the IAD is not treated as a unique privilege conferred by the 
states on their corporate creations, then incorporating states no longer 
can claim special powers to exclusively regulate corporate contracts 
above and beyond their powers to regulate other contracts. 
Just as contractual choice of law does not oust state and federal 
regulatory powers in the general law market, neither does it do so in the 
corporate law market.  At the same time, this article’s analysis provides a 
basis for determining how far state and federal regulation should go.  
The functioning of the law market suggests appropriate constraints on 
state refusal to enforce contractual choice of law.  It also shows why the 
federal government ought generally defer to state law as long as the 
states are able to coordinate their regulation through the law market. 
The article proceeds as follows.  Part I discusses the “demand” side 
of both the market for law generally and the market for corporate law. 
The demand side of the market involves parties’ desire to choose their 
governing law and its influence on their decisions regarding where to lo-
cate, invest, and litigate.  Those choices influence the extent to which 
states are willing to enable parties to contract for their governing law.  
The same mechanisms that explain enforcement of other contractual 
choices also explain the origins of the IAD and the rules governing the 
corporate law market.  Broad enforcement of the IAD resulted from cor-
porations’ mobility and interest groups’ incentives both to provide cor-
porate law and to refrain from driving commerce to other jurisdictions. 
Part II discusses the “supply” side of the law market.  It shows how 
jurisdictions (or more precisely their politicians) compete for residents, 
investment, and litigation.  Some states are actively competing for law 
business, and in those states the competition is driven most importantly 
by lawyers.  Other states, while not competing for business, nevertheless 
have responded to party mobility by enforcing contractual choice-of-law, 
choice-of-forum, and arbitration clauses in an effort to retain residents, 
jobs, investments, and tax revenues.  These market forces have caused 
the law to move toward very general enforcement of contractual choice 
of law, at least in commercial cases.  Similar forces are at work for corpo-
rations.  Here, too, lawyers have played a key role in promoting active 
competition, particularly in Delaware. 
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Part III discusses the specific limitations on the general and corpo-
rate law markets that persist due to weaknesses in the forces of demand 
and supply.  In the general law market, courts often require a connection 
between the parties and the contractually designated state, and even then 
a court can refuse to apply the law chosen by the parties if that law would 
interfere with the fundamental public policy of another state.  Where 
these limitations are imposed, pro-regulatory interest groups have suc-
cessfully resisted the competitive pressures of the law market.  However, 
in order to facilitate interstate trade, the federal government can always 
preempt these states’ refusals to enforce choice-of-law clauses.  The rules 
for corporations seem on the surface to be quite different because they 
lack both the “connection” requirement and the public policy exception.  
On closer examination, however, law market forces have produced simi-
lar rules for corporate and for other commercial contracts.  Courts in 
several states have relaxed the connection requirement for commercial 
noncorporate contracts.  Conversely, corporations are subject to state 
public policies, though these policies tend to be located formally outside 
the IAD.  Finally, the costly multiplicity of state corporate law has been a 
significant factor in the development of several federal laws. 
Part IV further undercuts the notion of a distinct corporate law 
market by showing that there are both variations within the corporate 
law market and links between the market for corporate law and the mar-
ket for other types of contracts.  This analysis demonstrates how little the 
IAD in fact explains about the corporate law market and how much, 
rather, is explained by the operation of supply and demand forces. 
Part V, then, develops the general implications of this article’s 
analysis for constitutional law, the limits on state and federal regulation, 
and for future scholarship. 
I. THE DEMAND SIDE OF THE LAW MARKET 
This Part begins to situate the corporate law market within the 
forces that drive the general market for law.  We discuss the demand for 
contractual choice of law that drives both markets.  Our focus here is on 
how the forces of jurisdictional competition promote widespread en-
forcement of contractual choice of law.  In other words, we focus on how 
contracting for law arises, rather than on the competition that contractual 
choice generates.  We discuss the latter issue in our later discussion of the 
structure of the corporate law market.22 
In general, we show that the law market exists because parties to 
most relationships that involve contracts have a strong incentive to con-
tract for their governing law.  Firms and individuals want both to clarify 
 
 22. See infra Part IV. 
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the legal rules that will apply to their contract and to select laws that en-
hance the likelihood that their agreement will be enforced as they intend. 
The important question is why courts, with at least the tacit permis-
sion of legislators, would enforce these contracts at the expense of their 
own state’s regulation even when that regulation is supported by strong 
interest groups in the state.  Part of the answer is that contracting parties 
can be viewed as “shopping” for, or demanding, the regulation and adju-
dication of particular states.  Contracting parties can impose two types of 
costs on states that attempt to impose regulation that cannot be avoided 
through party choice.  First, the parties can decide to make investments 
in states that favor their preferred contracts and to avoid states that dis-
favor them.  Second, the parties can avoid or choose to litigate in courts 
depending on the courts’ willingness to respect their preferences for a 
particular state’s law.  Generally, the demand side of the law market fo-
cuses on parties’ desire to have their choice-of-law clauses enforced.  In 
the market for corporate law, the demand side is driven by the firm’s 
choice of the place of incorporation. 
A. The General Law Market 
This subpart introduces the demand side forces in the law market 
generally, while subpart B considers demand side forces specific to the 
market for corporate law.  The demand side of the law market entails 
two inquiries.  First, why do parties contract for law?  As discussed in 
subsection 1, the parties attempt to choose their governing law in order 
to enhance predictability and fit, and to attempt to eliminate multiple po-
tentially inconsistent legal mandates.  Second, subsection 2 discusses why 
each state as a political entity has incentives to enforce party choice of 
law even when enforcement of these choices enables the parties to evade 
that state’s laws.  State cooperation depends on the parties’ options when 
confronted by a court or legislature that refuses to enforce the contract. 
1. Why Do Parties Contract for Law? 
Parties contract for law to ensure that their disputes will be resolved 
according to the law that best fits their relationship.  Because the parties’ 
contract embodies the basic terms of their relationship, the quest for fit 
implies that the parties want a law that enforces their contract.  Without 
a choice-of-law clause, the parties to interstate contracts cannot confi-
dently predict what law a court ultimately will apply to their dispute.  
According to the dominant rule on choice of law for contracts in the 
United States, courts will apply the law of the state with “the most sig-
nificant relationship to the transaction and the parties.”23  When two par-
ties contract exclusively with one another, it can be difficult for them to 
 
 23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188(1) (1971). 
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determine at the time of contracting which state has the most significant 
relationship.  Uncertainty creates even more difficulty when a firm con-
tracts with many suppliers, creditors, employees, and/or customers, be-
cause a different governing law could end up applying to each contract. 
Contracting for law enables the parties to know what law will apply 
not only at trial, but also when contracting.  Obviously the parties need 
to know when contracting not only whether and to what extent a court 
will enforce their contract, but also what default rules it will apply, and 
whether the contract language will be interpreted rigidly or flexibly.  For 
example, New York courts tend to adhere fairly closely to the language 
of the contract, while California courts are known for their greater flexi-
bility.24  Contracting for law is also critical when a firm enters into the 
same basic relationship with multiple people or firms.  A contract that 
selects a particular state’s law enables the firm to adopt a single firmwide 
policy for its performance that applies to all similar dealings. 
Thus, by making an enforceable choice of law, parties can obtain a 
better fit and greater certainty and predictability, and they are better 
able to streamline their operating policies than is otherwise possible un-
der default choice-of-law rules.  These benefits give the parties the incen-
tive to choose their governing law wherever possible.  This is reflected in 
the fact that choice-of-law clauses are routinely included in most com-
mercial contracts today.25 
2. Party Mobility 
While contracting for law has obvious benefits for the parties, it 
presents a problem for state lawmakers.  Because state regulation of con-
tracts can be negated if parties can opt out of that regulation by choosing 
alternative governing laws, courts and legislatures in regulating states 
have obvious incentives not to enforce those choices.  How can parties 
overcome these difficulties?  The answer begins with the alternatives 
available to contracting parties when confronted by courts or legislatures 
that refuse to enforce their choices (referred to here as “nonenforcing” 
states). 
One alternative parties have to ensure enforcement of their choices 
is to prevent nonenforcing courts from exercising personal jurisdiction 
over them.  Without personal jurisdiction, the nonenforcing state lacks 
power to compel that party to enter its courts.  Personal jurisdiction is 
limited in the United States by the Due Process Clauses in the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.26  Due Process pre-
 
 24. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Market for Contracts 35 (Law & Econ. 
Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 06-45, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=938557. 
 25. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Ex Ante Choices of Law and Forum: An Em-
pirical Analysis of Corporate Merger Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1975, 1978 (2006); Larry E. Rib-
stein, From Efficiency to Politics in Contractual Choice of Law, 37 GA. L. REV. 363, 400, 403 (2003). 
 26. See U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV. 
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vents states from asserting jurisdiction over parties who lack “minimum 
contacts” with the state.27  Minimum contacts involve directing action 
toward the forum in a way that makes it fair to require the person to de-
fend a lawsuit involving the action in that state.28  In addition, a court 
may assert “general” jurisdiction over a defendant that has extensive lo-
cal contacts, such as maintaining a principal place of business, even if the 
contacts did not arise out of or relate to the particular transaction at is-
sue.29  By limiting the contacts with a state to those that are nonextensive, 
a firm can deprive a state’s courts of the ability to exercise general juris-
diction over it.  By avoiding the state altogether, a firm can defeat that 
state’s ability to exercise even more limited specific jurisdiction over the 
firm. 
The ability of firms to manipulate contacts with states is important 
not just for personal jurisdiction, but also to control the outcome of a 
choice-of-law analysis.  Prior to the 1930s, choice-of-law rules in the U.S. 
were based mainly on a “vested rights” approach, under which states ac-
quired law-making jurisdiction if acts relevant to the cause of action oc-
curred within the state.30  Under this approach, the important event for 
contracts was the contract formation, although there was authority for 
applying the place of formation designated in the contract itself, particu-
larly if the contract spanned several states.31  In the 1960s, an alternative 
choice-of-law approach evolved under the influence of Brainerd Currie 
to one based on state “interests.”32  Under Currie’s approach, legislatures 
were presumed to have an “interest” in applying local laws only to bene-
fit local residents.33  If multiple states had an interest in applying their 
laws, the forum—which could be anywhere the plaintiff could get per-
sonal jurisdiction over the defendant—applied its law.34  About half of 
the states now apply a third method, the Second Restatement’s most sig-
nificant relationship test, to determine the governing law for contracts 
disputes.35  Courts making that determination look to a variety of con-
tacts, including the places of contracting, negotiation, subject matter of 
the contract, performance, and the location of the parties,36 as well as to 
 
 27. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980); Int’l Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
 28. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 111–12 (1987). 
 29. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414–15 (1984).  For a gen-
eral discussion of the constraints on personal jurisdiction in the U.S. and Europe, see RUSSELL J. 
WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 4.9C (4th ed. 2001). 
 30. See JAMES A. MARTIN, CONFLICT OF LAWS 16–17 (2d ed. 1985). 
 31. See Erin A. O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1151 (2000). 
 32. See generally BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963). 
 33. See, e.g., id. at 201–02 (discussing California’s interest in protecting community from cost of 
injured employee). 
 34. See Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1277, 1315–17 (1989) 
(describing Currie’s approach). 
 35. EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS § 18.21, at 1002–03 n.14 (4th ed. 2004). 
 36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188(2) (1971). 
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seven general principles that guide all choice-of-law questions.37  For 
most modern approaches, the likelihood of a law applying to a dispute 
tends to rise as a party’s connection with a state grows. 
Firms’ contacts with states also matter because most states follow 
the Second Restatement rules conditioning enforcement of contractual 
choice of law on parties’ connections with the designated state.  The Sec-
ond Restatement drafters recognized that an indeterminate approach to 
choice of law threatened to undermine the predictability that parties 
value in forming contracts.  Accordingly, they included a provision de-
signed to maximize the extent to which parties are able to choose their 
own law to govern their relationships.  Regarding default rules, or rules 
of contract interpretation, parties can pick any law they wish.38  This re-
flects the parties’ ability to include these rules directly in their contracts.  
The Second Restatement also provides for some enforcement of the par-
ties’ choice even if enforcing the choice has the effect of enabling the par-
ties to circumvent a mandatory rule.  The Second Restatement directs 
courts to bar enforcement as to mandatory rules where the contract des-
ignates a state that “has no substantial relationship to the parties or the 
transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties’ 
choice,” or where the chosen state has a “substantial relationship” with 
the parties or contract but the chosen law is “contrary to a fundamental 
policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than the chosen 
state in the determination of the particular issue” and that state would be 
selected under general choice-of-law principles.39 
The current version of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC or the 
Code) also gives parties significant latitude to contract for their own gov-
erning law.  In business-to-business transactions the UCC provides that 
the parties can effectively contract for the application of a state’s law 
even if the law does not satisfy the reasonable relationship requirement.40  
The contractual choice is not effective if it would force courts to apply 
law that would be contrary to a fundamental policy of the “default” ju-
risdiction—i.e., the state or country whose connection with the parties or 
transaction would justify applying its law in the absence of agreement.41  
By contrast, in transactions involving a consumer, the Code requires that 
the parties have a reasonable relationship with the designated state, and 
it stipulates that choice-of-law clauses may not deprive the consumer of 
the protection of a law in which the consumer principally resides or other 
jurisdiction where the contract is made or the goods delivered.42  The 
pre-amended version of the Code still in force in most states requires 
 
 37. Id. § 6. 
 38. Id. § 187(1). 
 39. Id. § 187(2). 
 40. U.C.C. § 1-301(c)(1) (2004). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. § 1-301(e)(2). 
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only that the parties to all UCC contracts have a reasonable relationship 
with the designated state.43 
In sum, both the governing law under general choice-of-law rules 
and the enforcement of choice-of-law clauses typically depend on the 
parties’ contacts with both the state whose law is chosen and the states 
whose laws they want to avoid.  The parties’ ability to use a choice-of-law 
clause to avoid a state’s mandatory rule therefore depends not only on 
avoiding connections with the undesirable state, which may be difficult 
or impossible for a national firm, but also on establishing enough of a 
connection with a desirable state that that state’s interest might be 
deemed to outweigh the interest of the undesirable state.  This gives con-
tracting parties—particularly interstate or global firms that rely exten-
sively on choice-of-law clauses—incentives to establish close connections 
with, or perhaps base operations in, states that enforce the parties’ con-
tracts, including choice-of-law clauses. 
Party mobility in response to regulation is becoming more impor-
tant as the costs of mobility decline.  With the rise of computers, the 
Internet, express delivery service, and other technological innovations, 
modern business relies less on bricks-and-mortar buildings and more on 
geographically independent or mobile assets such as intellectual property 
and human capital.  Shrinking trade barriers let firms find trade and in-
vestment opportunities anywhere in the world.  This means firms may be 
increasingly willing and able both to avoid jurisdictions that impose 
tough restrictions and to move to states that can offer desirable packages 
of legal rules, including a general policy of enforcing contracts.  A state 
can compete to attract these firms in one of two ways.  First, it can at-
tempt to provide an appealing bundle of laws to enhance the range of 
firms’ activities.  Second, a state can attract mobile assets by providing an 
important subset of the laws firms desire, such as corporate law, while 
enabling those firms to freely contract for other states’ laws when local 
laws prove unsuitable. 
Finally, it might seem that, despite firms’ increasing mobility, their 
location decisions would be driven primarily by factors other than en-
forceability of choice-of-law contracts, such as tax burdens and infra-
structure.  However, the impact of location on enforcement of choice of 
law may sometimes be a significant marginal consideration.  For exam-
ple, there is data indicating that franchisors have made location decisions 
based on the enforceability of choice-of-law and related clauses in fran-
chise contracts.44  Nevertheless, the extent of firm mobility, and therefore 
of its costs or benefits to states, depends partly on what benefits a state 
can offer firms to offset the costs of bad laws.  The more desirable a loca-
tion is because of its non-law attributes such as its labor pool, its exten-
 
 43. Id. § 1-105 (1954). 
 44. See Jonathan Klick et al., The Effect of Contract Regulation: The Case of Franchises 6 (Dec. 
13, 2006) (unpublished research paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=951464. 
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sive consumer market, or its plentiful natural resources, the more it can 
get away with imposing costs on firms through harsh regulations pro-
moted by local interest groups.  We would therefore expect large, rich 
states like California to be less responsive to the law market than small 
states like Delaware. 
3. Controlling the Forum 
Contracting parties can increase the probability that a choice-of-law 
clause will be enforced by choosing to have their disputes resolved in a 
forum that lacks a political incentive to block exit from state mandatory 
rules.  Parties have three ways of controlling the forum.  First, the parties 
can choose the court or other dispute resolution forum at the time of liti-
gation.  The plaintiff obviously has some control over where to file a law-
suit.  Even a potential defendant often can control the forum for litiga-
tion by filing a declaratory judgment action.  Moreover, a defendant may 
be able to remove plaintiff’s case to a federal court where there is the 
requisite diversity of citizenship.45  This removal power is significant be-
cause federal courts have less incentive than state courts to block exit 
from mandatory rules imposed by the state legislature.  Although in a di-
versity jurisdiction case the federal court must apply the local state 
choice-of-law rule,46 these rules give judges significant discretion to en-
force choice-of-law clauses.47 
Second, the parties can include a court-selection clause in their con-
tract.  State courts obviously have a stronger incentive to apply local law 
than they do the law of another state.  Accordingly, the parties can en-
hance the likelihood that the court will enforce the choice-of-law clause if 
they agree that the case will be tried in the state whose law the contract 
selects.48  State courts do fairly routinely enforce choice-of-court clauses, 
at least in commercial cases.49  One might wonder why courts would be 
likelier to enforce choice-of-court clauses than choice-of-law clauses if 
enforcing the former is tantamount to enforcing the latter.  A possible 
explanation is that a choice-of-court clause enables the court to enforce 
the parties’ contract while at the same time refraining from making an 
explicit policy choice between local law and the law designated in the 
contract. 
Third, the parties can include an arbitration clause.  Private arbitra-
tors owe nothing to the state legislature, and must keep the parties satis-
fied in order to reap future arbitration business.  On balance, therefore, 
 
 45. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2000). 
 46. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). 
 47. See infra Part III. 
 48. O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 31, at 1158. 
 49. See Leandra Lederman, Viva Zapata!: Toward a Rational System of Forum-Selection Clause 
Enforcement in Diversity Cases, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 422 (1991); Michael E. Solimine, The Quiet Revo-
lution in Personal Jurisdiction, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1998). 
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they can be counted on to be more committed to enforcing contracts 
than to preventing evasion of mandatory rules.  The Federal Arbitration 
Act mandates that an arbitration clause in a contract that is valid under 
state law must be enforced not only by federal courts, but also by state 
courts when they decide cases that involve federal questions or interstate 
commerce.50  Because arbitration clauses can be used effectively to di-
minish the authority of nonenforcing courts,51 they reduce the stakes in-
volved in choice-of-court and choice-of-law clauses.  This may encourage 
courts to enforce these provisions as well. 
B. The Corporate Law Market and the IAD 
Viewed in its historical context, the IAD seems to have sprung full-
blown from the corporation’s origin as a creature of state law.  This his-
torical explanation appears, in turn, to explain why the states so readily 
recognized that the chartering state’s law controls the legal rights and ob-
ligations of the parties to the corporation.  However, the history of cor-
porate law fails to explain why courts and legislatures were willing to 
recognize corporations formed in other states, or why once they did rec-
ognize those corporations they were willing to apply those states’ gov-
ernance laws.  In other words, the state-creation origins of corporate law, 
instead of leading to broad acceptance of the IAD, could just as easily 
have led to rules confining state-created corporations to the states of 
their creation.  Indeed, this alternative result would seem to have been 
more likely since state legislators once controlled corporate rights and 
privileges and derived benefits from this control.  Lawmakers’ benefits 
from the incorporation process would not be worth much if corporations 
could buy charters from any state and do business in any other states, 
since this would expose chartering states to ruinous price competition 
over the provision of these charters.  So, we have to explain why state 
courts and legislators were willing to enforce a rule that broke down their 
profitable territorial monopolies.  The explanation lies in an understand-
ing of the general market for law.  Paralleling the discussion of the gen-
eral law market, subsection 1 discusses corporations’ incentives to con-
tract for the law relating to internal governance.  Subsection 2 discusses 
how corporate mobility contributed to the demand side of the market for 
corporate law.52 
 
 50. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–14 (2000). 
 51. See Stephen Ware, Default Rules From Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitra-
tion, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703 (1999) (arguing that the Federal Arbitration Act’s broad enforcement of 
arbitration in effect permits evasion of mandatory rules). 
 52. Since the rules governing the corporate law market were established prior to the general en-
forcement of choice-of-forum and arbitration clauses in the United States, there is no corporate paral-
lel to this aspect of the general law market.  However, the strength of the market forces for corporate 
law compared to the equivalent forces in the general law market explains why forum choice was un-
necessary to facilitate the corporate law market. 
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1. Why Do Parties Contract for Corporate Law? 
Firms have precisely the same reasons to choose the law governing 
the relations among the parties to the firm as all contracting parties have 
to choose governing law: to ensure that their disputes will be resolved ac-
cording to the law that best fits their relationship, to enable the parties to 
know what law will apply at the time of contracting, and to allow the firm 
to deal on the same basis with multiple parties. 
One apparent difference between the two contexts is that the need 
of corporations for the same law regarding multiple contracting parties is 
obviously greater than it is for parties to most other contracts.  For ex-
ample, divvying up a common pool of resources and applying voting 
rules would present a logistical nightmare for a national (not to mention 
international) firm facing different restrictions in each state in which its 
shareholders reside.  Indeed, the need for a common rule is so compel-
ling that it seems to distinguish corporate internal governance from other 
types of contracts.  However, viewing corporations in the context of the 
general law market makes it obvious that corporations differ from most 
contracting parties in this respect in degree rather than in kind.  More-
over, corporations’ need for one rule does not mean that they need to be 
able to designate that rule by contract.  Finally, to the extent that corpo-
rations’ need for a single rule does distinguish corporate internal govern-
ance from other types of contracts, it follows that firms had a commensu-
rately stronger incentive to avoid states that refused to enforce their 
choice of state of incorporation. 
2. Party Mobility 
The increasing mobility of the corporation in the latter part of the 
nineteenth century was an important factor in developing the IAD.  In-
deed, the corporate law market might be said to be a product of the in-
dustrial revolution.  Technological advances like the railroad and tele-
graph, mass advertising, and assembly line production gave rise to firms 
whose production facilities and headquarters were distinct from their na-
tionwide markets.53  This let firms operate outside their states of incorpo-
ration and therefore choose their incorporating state based on a state’s 
law and legal environment rather than only on its resources and markets.  
In addition, firms could avoid investing assets in states that were hostile 
to foreign corporations, withholding valuable assets and jobs from them.  
This would upset powerful business and labor interest groups within the 
state, which could be expected to lobby against such hostile legislation.  
At the same time, firms could continue to access state markets because 
 
 53. See ALFRED CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND 203–06 (1977). 
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the Commerce Clause prevented the states from discriminating against 
or imposing unreasonable burdens on interstate trade.54 
Until the 1890s, corporate mobility mainly promoted state competi-
tion for investments rather than for charters, since at that time corpora-
tions still had to incorporate in states with which they had significant con-
tacts.55  States could lure corporate investments by offering an attractive 
tax and regulatory environment, and by making it easier to get corporate 
charters.  A “general incorporation” option, by which any firm could 
form a corporation without getting special permission from the state, 
gradually replaced special chartering.56  At first, however, the states were 
content to divide up the incorporation market and limit their competition 
to one for corporate investments rather than for charters.57  In other 
words, firms had to incorporate where they were based.  In order to cre-
ate today’s corporate law market, states had to be willing to incorporate 
“tramp” firms that had no local connections. 
The equilibrium shifted when changes in business practices and 
technologies increased the benefits of prohibited practices and gave firms 
incentives to avoid regulatory impediments.  For example, firms needed 
more flexibility in pricing their shares for sale in dynamic capital markets 
than they had under rules developed before these markets were avail-
able.58  Until then, firms had a choice either to engage in costly lobbying 
to remove local impediments or to move to states with laxer laws.  
Clearly they would welcome being able to choose a state’s law without 
physically moving there.  The time was ripe for a state to become a first 
mover to attract foreign firms to incorporate locally. 
New Jersey became that first mover.  It had earlier acquired a fi-
nancial incentive to compete for charters when it extended its railroad 
taxation scheme to tax non-railroad corporations on the basis of their 
capital stock.  The scheme was not based on the corporations’ presence 
in the state.59  New Jersey, therefore, was able to increase revenues de-
spite losing railroad tax revenues by “charter-mongering,” or using a 
flexible corporation law to attract incorporations by out-of-state firms 
which maintained no more than a virtual presence in New Jersey.60 
The standard version of the New Jersey success story is that its key 
innovation was to expressly permit holding companies.61  Under this 
story, New Jersey acquired importance and national stature through the 
 
 54. See infra text accompanying note 244. 
 55. See Tung, supra note 9, at 62–64. 
 56. See Henry N. Butler, Nineteenth Century Jurisdictional Competition in the Granting of Cor-
porate Privileges, 14 J. LEG. STUD. 129 (1985). 
 57. See id. 
 58. See infra text accompanying note 71. 
 59. See Christopher Grandy, New Jersey Corporate Charter-Mongering, 1875–1929, 49 J. ECON. 
HIST. 677, 680–81 (1989). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
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efforts of John D. Rockefeller to bring the first of the large integrated 
enterprises that were emerging from the Industrial Revolution into a co-
hesive legal form.62  When the Ohio Supreme Court ruled in 1892 that 
the trust agreement binding Standard Oil of Ohio was an illegal attempt 
to monopolize the petroleum business, Rockefeller and his advisors al-
ready were studying the New Jersey innovation.63  After the Ohio deci-
sion, Standard Oil simply dissolved the trust and formed a New Jersey 
holding company.64 
An alternative explanation of New Jersey’s success offered by Law-
rence Mitchell is that New Jersey included very favorable provisions 
permitting the use of stock to buy property and, more importantly, sub-
stantially empowered the directors to set the valuation.65  Mitchell notes 
that New Jersey offered other advantages, including protecting officers 
and directors from actions brought in New Jersey under other states’ 
laws.66 
Even after New Jersey opened Pandora’s Box and started compet-
ing for charters, there was still an important ingredient missing from the 
corporate law market.  Other states technically could have resisted by 
continuing to apply their own restrictive laws to their corporations that 
sought to combine with New Jersey corporations.  The states could, for 
example, adopt something like the European “real seat” rule discussed 
below67 that would have applied local law to New Jersey tramp corpora-
tions headquartered in the state.  Because it parallels the Second Re-
statement’s most significant relationship test, a “real seat” rule would re-
sult in the same choice-of-law treatment as other contracts.  Why did the 
states not take this step?68 
The explanation for why other states became willing to respect a 
corporation’s choice of internal governance law ultimately rests, at least 
in part, on demand-side factors that link corporations with other contexts 
for applying contractual choice of law.  Corporations, like other firms, 
could physically exit states that otherwise refuse to apply the law of the 
incorporating state.  More precisely, corporations could avoid contacts 
 
 62. See RON CHERNOW, TITAN: THE LIFE OF JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER, SR. 332–33 (Random 
House 1998). 
 63. Id. 
 64. See id. 
 65. See LAWRENCE MITCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY: HOW FINANCE TRIUMPHED 
OVER INDUSTRY 48–54 (2007). 
 66. Id. at 54–55. 
 67. See infra Part IV.D. 
 68. In a draft paper, John Coates discusses some of the elements of this explanation of the IAD.  
See John C. Coates IV, The Legal Origins of the (Unimportant) U.S. “Market” for Corporate Charters 
(October 18, 2004) (on file with authors).  Coates shows that host states legally could have prevented 
the operation of the IAD.  Coates explains their failure to do so mostly by the triviality of much of 
corporate law, and by the fact that many of the significant issues have been separated from corporate 
law and dealt with under non-“corporate” state and, most importantly, federal law.  This discussion is 
consistent with much of the story presented in this article, though unlike the present article, Coates 
does not analyze the IAD in light of general market for law. 
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with other states that would make it possible for their courts to apply 
their law to the corporation.  In other words, firms could strategically 
choose where to sell their stock and where to locate their factories and 
other corporate assets so as to avoid states that refused to recognize the 
law of the incorporating state.69 
One might be skeptical that in expanded interstate markets corpo-
rations had a realistic opportunity to avoid states that threatened to regu-
late their internal governance.  Suppose, for example, states aggressively 
attempted to regulate corporate governance on the basis of having just 
enough contact to exercise personal jurisdiction.70  Corporations would 
then be forced to go to great lengths to forgo conducting business with 
customers, suppliers, or shareholders in the regulating state.  Is it likely 
corporations would incur these costs just to get the internal governance 
rules they wanted?  If not, what incentives would states have to forgo 
regulating foreign firms’ internal governance? 
At least two factors might explain why firms’ physical mobility was 
enough to motivate states to respect the IAD.  First, expanding corpora-
tions had a strong need for flexible rules.  For example, in order to access 
rapidly developing capital markets, firms needed relief from rules requir-
ing newly issued securities to be sold at par.71  Thus, differences between 
modern corporate rules and those based in early corporate history mat-
tered enough to corporate development that firms might be willing to in-
cur significant costs to avoid states with outmoded rules.  Second, as dis-
cussed in subsection 1, firms had a strong practical need for assurance 
that a single rule would apply to all of their members.  To be sure, these 
demand-side factors alone are not enough to explain why states re-
sponded to the threat of corporate exit by applying the law of the state of 
incorporation.  As with the general law market, this calls for a supply-
side explanation, which we provide below in Part II. 
Whatever the explanation for the acceptance of a market in corpo-
rate law, the market clearly exists today.  This is demonstrated by the 
denouement of the story of the corporate law market’s early history.  
The corporation leader in the United States is now Delaware.  What 
happened to New Jersey?  Interest groups and reformers protested that 
New Jersey’s law facilitated monopolies.72  While one of these reformers, 
Woodrow Wilson, was governor of New Jersey, the state in 1913 
amended its corporation law to restrict holding companies and add strict 
antitrust provisions.73  New Jersey’s next door neighbor then took over its 
incorporation business just as New Jersey had taken Standard Oil from 
 
 69. See MITCHELL, supra note 65, at 30–56. 
 70. See supra text accompanying notes 27–29 (discussing constitutional limits on personal juris-
diction). 
 71. See MITCHELL, supra note 65 (discussing the importance of stock pricing rules to New Jer-
sey’s early charter competition). 
 72. See Grandy, supra note 59, at 687. 
 73. Id. at 689. 
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Ohio.  In 1917, after Wilson moved on to higher office and New Jersey 
saw what it had done to itself, the state tried to recapture its lost glory by 
reversing its moves.  But by then it was too late—Delaware was already 
entrenched, corporations did not trust the New Jersey legislature,74 and 
in any event Delaware gave them no reason to leave. 
II. THE SUPPLY SIDE 
This Part discusses how the supply side of both the law market gen-
erally and the market for corporate law can promote enforcement of con-
tractual choice of law, and thereby foster the sort of jurisdictional compe-
tition that has generally been associated with the corporate law market.  
The mandatory rules that parties seek to avoid with choice-of-law clauses 
are often produced by powerful interest groups.  However, exit and entry 
by contracting parties create costs or benefits for other interest groups in 
the state.  These “exit-affected” interest groups can combine with the 
groups that are directly burdened by the regulation to promote contrac-
tual choice of law even if the antiregulatory groups could not alone either 
defeat the regulation or provide for enforcement of party choice.  Sub-
part A discusses the supply side of the law market generally, while sub-
part B parallels this discussion with an analysis of the similar forces at 
work in the corporate law market.75 
A. The General Law Market 
As suppliers of law to the law market, each state typically occupies 
one of two positions.  Some states, which we will call “competing” states, 
seek to have their laws selected by contracting parties.  Other states, 
which we will call “noncompeting” states, must then decide whether to 
enforce these choices when their courts entertain suits involving those 
contracts. 
1. Competing States 
Some states have announced their intention to enforce choice-of-
law clauses.  Specifically, California, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, New 
York, and Texas each have statutes that provide for the automatic en-
forcement of choice-of-law clauses that designate the state’s law in high 
 
 74. Id. 
 75. We treat state judges and legislators as a single group of lawmakers, implicitly assuming that 
their incentives are similar.  In fact, both elected and appointed judges may have stronger incentives 
than legislators not to enforce choice-of-law contracts.  See Ribstein, supra note 25, at 448–49.  The 
justification for treating the two sets of lawmakers as a unit is that state judges ultimately are subject to 
the interest group forces discussed below in this Part through the ballot or appointment process and 
legislators’ ability to prescribe by statute the effect of choice-of-law statutes. 
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value contracts.76  There is also data indicating that the law of these 
states, and particularly New York and Delaware, are often designated in 
choice-of-law clauses.77 
Lawyers clearly are an important factor in motivating these states to 
compete for choice-of-law business.78  Lawyers have significant advan-
tages over other interest groups (such as taxpayers or low-wage workers) 
in promoting the law market.  Lawyers may have lower costs of political 
advocacy than most groups because they can produce their own lobbying 
activities and can coordinate their political activities through existing bar 
associations.  Lawyers also have incentives to invest their time in law re-
form because this helps them acquire an aura of professionalism and en-
hances their reputations for expertise in particular areas of the law. 
Although lawyers can work on the law of any state, they have a spe-
cial incentive to devote efforts to the law of the particular state in which 
they are licensed79 because licensing laws give lawyers exclusive rights to 
practice in the state’s courts, and they also help local lawyers in their ef-
forts to advise clients who are based in the state.80  Because judges tend 
to apply forum-state law, the right to practice in a particular court carries 
with it an interest in that court’s local law.  Also, firms may establish 
connections with states in order to increase the chances that the state’s 
law will apply to their contracts, and local investments often translate 
into demand for local lawyers.  It follows that the quality of a state’s legal 
environment, including whether the state enforces contractual choice of 
law, may affect a lawyer’s business.  Lawyers therefore have an incentive 
to improve the quality of their licensing state’s law in order to attract cli-
ents for transactional work and as litigants in local courts.  Accordingly, 
lawyers’ participation in lawmaking can serve the interests of both law-
yers and clients.  Given the importance of lawyers on the supply side of 
the law market, it is not surprising that each of the states that have sig-
naled their desire to compete in the law market by enacting choice-of-law 
statutes has a large and sophisticated commercial bar that is seeking a na-
tional clientele for both litigation and transactional work. 
The incentives emphasized in this article differ from those of law-
yers who want local and state laws favorable to plaintiffs suing national 
 
 76. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1646.5 (West Supp. 2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2708 (2005); FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 685.101 (West 2003); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/5-5 (West 2003); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. 
LAW § 5-1401 (Consol. 2007); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 35.51–.52 (Vernon 2002).  The Texas 
statute also provides for enforcement of choice-of-law provisions that choose other states’ laws pro-
vided that the transaction has a connection with the state whose law is chosen.  For an analysis of these 
statutes, see Larry E. Ribstein, Delaware, Lawyers, and Contractual Choice of Law, 19 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. 999 (1994). 
 77. See infra Part IV.F. 
 78. See Ribstein, supra note 76 (discussing lawyers’ role in promulgation of state choice-of-law 
statutes). 
 79. Because it is costly to be licensed in a particular state, lawyers tend to be licensed only in the 
state where they reside and maybe one or two others. 
 80. See Larry E. Ribstein, Lawyers as Lawmakers: A Theory of Lawyer Licensing, 69 MO. L. 
REV. 299, 302 (2004). 
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firms, often as representatives of nationwide classes of plaintiffs.  In the 
class action cases, the plaintiff in effect unilaterally chooses the law by 
choosing where to sue.  By contrast, the law selected in a choice-of-law 
clause must, in theory at least, appeal to both contracting parties.81  Thus, 
lawyers interested in attracting choice-of-law business may tend to favor 
different types of laws than those interested in attracting plaintiffs. 
2. Noncompeting States 
Given that some states compete for choice-of-law business, why do 
other states, whose lawyers are not competing effectively for national liti-
gation and transactional business, cooperate with party efforts to choose 
law?  In other words, what motivates “noncompeting” states to enforce 
choice-of-law clauses that would have the effect of sending litigation and 
transactional work to the competing states?  We have seen in subpart A 
that, if states do not enforce contractual choice of law, parties can avoid 
their borders and their courts by moving their assets to enforcing states.  
However, we need to understand how that mobility translates into politi-
cal incentives to enforce contractual choice of law despite the state law-
makers’ obvious interest in enforcing local mandatory laws.  This re-
quires an examination of the interest group dynamic in noncompeting 
states created by party mobility. 
To begin with, any regulation that has the effect of attracting or re-
pelling business contributes or detracts from the state’s overall business 
environment, and thereby may affect everybody who is a part of this en-
vironment.  Businesses pay taxes that may exceed the costs of the ser-
vices they consume.  Businesses employ workers of all types and buy 
goods and services from other businesses in the state.  All of these bene-
ficiaries of a favorable legal environment potentially can put pressure on 
lawmakers to create such an environment. 
In the standard political equation, regulation results from conten-
tion between interest groups that directly gain and lose from the regula-
tion—that is, between “proregulatory” and “antiregulatory” groups.  The 
winner is the group that has the most political resources, which depends 
not only on the size of the group but also on its costs of coordinating.82  A 
relatively small group therefore may be able to successfully promote leg-
islation that imposes net costs on society because the costs are borne by 
individuals who have more difficulty coordinating.  Most importantly for 
 
 81. This can be true whether the clause is negotiated or simply accepted as part of a standard 
form by a consumer or other party.  To be sure, there may be a question in some circumstances 
whether the choice-of-law clause is priced into the contract.  Our point here is only that there is a gen-
eral distinction between the situation in which the law is specified ex ante in the contract and one in 
which it is determined ex post by a party’s choice of where to sue. 
 82. See generally MANCUR OLSON JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1971) (providing a 
comprehensive overview of group behavior). 
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present purposes, the costs of state legislation may fall on out-of-state 
firms while the benefits are incurred by powerful in-state groups. 
Now add mobility to the political mix.  Firms may leave the state to 
avoid regulation, and this can harm those locals who profited from their 
presence.  These “exit-affected” interest groups may add their voice to 
“antiregulatory” interest groups.  To be sure, groups affected by the re-
duction of in-state business may not be very effective.  For example, 
there is evidence that low-wage service industry employees in particular 
types of franchise outlets lost jobs as a result of franchise regulation.83  
These employees have little ability to act as a group, and therefore have 
much less political clout than existing franchisees.  The latter can act as a 
tightly coordinated group and are directly helped by franchise regulation.  
Nevertheless, if franchisors and existing franchisees are closely matched 
in political strength, the political scales might tip to franchisors if they are 
joined by, or can make arguments on behalf of, exit-affected groups. 
Exit also influences jurisdictional competition apart from contrac-
tual choice of law.  Firms often leave states that impose high taxes or 
regulatory costs.  For example, an insurer might leave a state where li-
ability costs are high or unpredictable.84  Firms’ physical exit or the threat 
of exit might cause the state to enforce a choice-of-law clause choosing 
the law of another state.  But the state also might decide simply to refrain 
from regulating or to deregulate.  Given this choice, why is contractual 
choice of law significant?  If the threat of exit could deter regulation, why 
should it matter whether these states enforce the parties’ choice of an-
other state’s law? 
Contractual choice of law is a distinct and important part of the po-
litical dynamic of jurisdictional competition.  First, as discussed above, 
firms and parties contract for law for reasons other than simply to avoid 
mandatory rules.85  They seek a single governing law, a better fit, and de-
sirable rules of contract interpretation.  States recognize that these bene-
fits are important enough to justify the enforcement of party choice in at 
least some circumstances. 
Second, enforcing contractual choice of law is often preferable to 
deregulation.  Political actors within a state might not know or be able to 
agree on what should replace the bad laws, and yet all might acknowl-
edge the need to enable mobile firms to avoid the law with a choice-of-
law clause.  Enforcing choice-of-law clauses might be a workable political 
compromise. 
Third, contractual choice of law gives states a potentially valuable 
mechanism for engaging in a form of political “price discrimination” be-
tween in-state and out-of-state firms.  Enforcing choice-of-law clauses 
 
 83. See Klick et al., supra note 44. 
 84. See, e.g., Michael Kunzelman, State Farm: No New Policies in Miss., ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
Feb. 14, 2007, available at http://abcnews.com/us/wirestory?id=2874970. 
 85. See supra Part I.A.1. 
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can be especially useful for interstate firms.  These firms tend to have 
lower costs of exit than firms whose business is concentrated in the state 
because interstate firms’ customers and suppliers are not confined to a 
specific place, and because they are already informed about other states’ 
regulations.  By keeping the regulation but letting firms avoid it through 
contractual choice of law, legislatures can at least preserve some effect of 
the regulation by imposing it on firms that have relatively high exit costs.  
The “discrimination” is benign in the sense that it can offset the advan-
tage that local firms have in interest group competition if out-of-state 
firms lack an exit option. 
B. The Corporate Law Market 
This subpart discusses the supply side of the corporate law market.  
As with the demand side, we see similar forces operating in both the 
general and corporate law markets.  Again, it is useful to distinguish be-
tween “competing” states, the most important of which is Delaware, and 
“noncompeting” states.  Also, we continue to focus on the dynamic that 
produced the IAD.  Given the IAD, states other than Delaware can be 
viewed as passively competing to retain incorporation business from 
their firms.86  But the question for present purposes is not only what mo-
tivates a state like Delaware to provoke a competition for corporate law, 
but also why other states play Delaware’s game rather than blocking this 
competition by refusing to enforce the IAD. 
1. Competing States 
The standard explanation of corporate law competition asserts that 
states compete to obtain local incorporation fees.87  Delaware’s franchise 
tax, which is imposed on all firms that incorporate in Delaware, is as high 
as $150,000 per firm.  In the aggregate, these franchise fees represent a 
significant percentage of the state budget of the small state.88  The fran-
chise fee story seems to disconnect the IAD from the rest of the law 
market, since franchise fees do not explain enforcement of other types of 
contractual choice of law. 
The franchise tax helps explain the shape of the particular market 
for publicly held corporations, which is dominated by a single state.  Be-
cause of Delaware’s small size, it is unique in its reliance on the tax, and 
therefore in the extent to which the franchise tax can “bond” it to com-
mit to providing high-quality corporate law.89  In other states, the reve-
 
 86. See infra Part IV.A. 
 87. See generally Cary, supra note 1. 
 88. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsider-
ing the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 556 (2002). 
 89. See infra text accompanying note 154. 
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nue incentive would likely not be enough to bind legislators to refrain 
from serving competing interest groups.90 
The franchise tax cannot, however, fully account for Delaware’s 
production of high-quality corporate law, and therefore falls short as an 
explanation of how Delaware drives the market for corporate law.  To be 
sure, individual taxpayers obviously would want the state to get revenues 
from corporate franchise fees rather than from individual income taxes 
and sales taxes.  But firms will not pay higher fees unless they get the sort 
of benefits Delaware can provide.  Even state legislators who care about 
franchise tax revenues may not want to devote the time and energy nec-
essary to providing a state-of-the-art corporation law and corporate in-
frastructure.91 
In addition to the franchise tax, and consistent with the general law 
market, lawyers are an explanation for the development of the corporate 
law market and the IAD.  For example, a lawyer named James B. Dill 
was almost single-handedly responsible for promoting New Jersey’s cor-
poration law.92  Delaware lawyers also have expressed their concern with 
protecting Delaware’s law market,93 and have played a direct role in de-
veloping Delaware corporate law.94  The Delaware corporate bar drafts 
the corporate laws for the legislature, which passes the lawyers’ recom-
mendations verbatim.95  In return, lawyers reap the significant benefits of 
a thriving corporate practice: Delaware lawyers’ income is fifty percent 
higher than lawyers in comparable states.96  Lawyers are also a significant 
force in developing corporate law outside of Delaware,97 and, as we will 
see below in Part IV, they help jurisdictional competition for noncorpo-
rate business associations. 
As with law generally,98 lawyers have a special incentive to develop 
the corporate law of their home state even though any lawyer can de-
velop an expertise in that law.  For example, only lawyers licensed in 
Delaware may practice regularly in Delaware courts.  These courts, in 
 
 90. See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 88, at 580–83. 
 91. See Douglas J. Cumming & Jeffrey G. MacIntosh, The Role of Interjurisdictional Competi-
tion in Shaping Canadian Corporate Law, 20 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 141, 144–46 (2000) (noting that 
most legislators do not gain enough from making their state’s law competitive to justify engaging pro-
actively in law reform). 
 92. See MITCHELL, supra note 65, at 39–42. 
 93. See Roberta Romano, Is Regulatory Competition a Problem or Irrelevant for Corporate Gov-
ernance?, 21 OXFORD REV. OF ECON. POL’Y 212, 218–21 (2005). 
 94. See Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History and Agency, 15 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 885, 899–901 (1990); William J. Carney, The Production of Corporate Law, 71 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 715, 722–28 (1998); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group The-
ory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 506–09 (1987); Ribstein, supra note 76, at 1009–
12. 
 95. See Alva, supra note 94, at 899–900. 
 96. See Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1946 (1998). 
 97. See generally Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate 
Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679 (2002). 
 98. See supra Part II.A.1. 
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fact, are a big reason why firms choose Delaware incorporation.99  Parties 
to cases in Delaware courts must hire Delaware lawyers to at least act as 
local counsel in litigation.  Also, Delaware lawyers’ inside knowledge of 
Delaware judges, procedures, and decisions could be expected to give 
them an edge in drafting agreements that Delaware judges will interpret.  
Delaware lawyers therefore have an incentive to write laws that will at-
tract corporations, and their litigation, to Delaware. 
2. Noncompeting States 
Neither the franchise tax nor lawyers can explain one important as-
pect of the corporate law market: why states that are not actively com-
peting for out-of-state corporations enforce their local firms’ choice of 
Delaware corporate law.  It is, of course, this enforcement by other states 
that enables the corporate law market to operate.  In particular, if law-
yers in states outside of Delaware want to encourage firms to incorporate 
locally, why do they not oppose applying Delaware corporate law to lo-
cally based firms?  After all, this would make lawyers’ expertise in their 
state’s local corporate law all the more valuable. 
There are at least three explanations for noncompeting states’ rec-
ognition of the IAD.  Although each of these factors alone probably can-
not explain states’ incentives, the factors arguably combine to motivate 
noncompeting states to enforce the IAD.  First, we have seen that in the 
general law market exit-affected interest groups can put pressure on 
states to enforce contractual choice of law in order to encourage firms to 
maintain connections with their states.100  The same forces contribute to 
the enforcement of the IAD in noncompeting states.  If firms avoid 
nonenforcing states, lawyers, for example, may lose potential clients and 
litigation business. 
Second, states have incentives to abide by a general rule that enti-
tles their own corporate governance rules to respect in other states.  
Courts understand that their decisions denying recognition of the IAD 
could be used against their own state’s corporations. 
Third, states have reason to be concerned about the fate of their 
own corporate governance law if they attempt to apply it to a firm incor-
porated elsewhere based on slight local contacts (for example, the resi-
dence of a few shareholders).  Because such a rule would impose high 
costs on firms,101 this could invite a strong legal reaction.  Even if the 
IAD itself does not have constitutional status,102 a state’s attempt to regu-
late the internal governance of firms that are nearly purely foreign might 
be unconstitutional under the Full Faith and Credit or Commerce 
 
 99. See infra text accompanying note 151. 
 100. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 101. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 102. See infra Part V.A (discussing constitutional protection of the IAD). 
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Clause.103  Moreover, such regulation might be enough to unite manage-
ment and shareholder groups to call for federal regulation of corporate 
governance.  Indeed, there was pressure for federal chartering of corpo-
rations in the early twentieth century.104 
To be sure, states might impose their laws on firms that have a 
strong local presence.105  This would at least avoid the harsh conse-
quences of applying many state laws to a single corporation.  But such a 
rule could deter firms from making significant local investments, which 
might trigger a local political backlash against the regulation.  That may 
explain why only New York and California—large, rich states that can 
offer firms significant non-law benefits for locating there—have at-
tempted this move.106  In other words, these states have a captive market 
that local interest groups can exploit, in part, by lobbying to apply local 
corporate law to foreign corporations. 
Even if noncompeting states have incentives to enforce other states’ 
laws, they could choose to impose limits on enforcement of the IAD 
similar to those applicable to noncorporate choice of law—that is, by re-
quiring a connection between the parties and the designated state and 
imposing a public policy exception on firm choice.  However, the IAD is 
more absolute than the general rules for enforcing contractual choice of 
law.  The next Part explains these differences in terms of the general 
supply and demand forces in the market for law. 
III. LIMITS ON ENFORCEMENT 
This Part discusses the limits on enforcement of contractual choice 
of law, in both the general and corporate law markets.  We show how the 
political dynamics created by the law market can perpetuate limitations 
on the enforcement of the parties’ choice of governing law.  Typical limi-
tations include requirements that the law chosen have a connection to 
the parties or transaction, and that it not violate the fundamental public 
policy of interested states.  Law market forces also help explain the situa-
tions in which these limitations are absent or have been eroded, particu-
larly in the corporate law market. 
Subpart A analyzes the limitations in the general law market, and 
subpart B analyzes the absence of limitations in the corporate law mar-
ket.  Subpart C explores the incentives that firms and interest groups 
 
 103. See infra Part V.A (discussing constitutional standards for choice of law). 
 104. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 105. This is something like the “real seat” rule that applies in Europe.  See infra Part IV.D. 
 106. Recent California cases are discussed in infra Part IV.D.  New York has incentives similar to 
California’s, and indeed has sought to regulate pseudo-foreign corporations.  See P. John Kozyris, 
Corporate Wars and Choice of Law, 1985 DUKE L.J. 1, 66–67 (discussing New York statutes applying 
New York corporation law to foreign corporations).  California has been more aggressive than New 
York recently, perhaps because New York wants to build a reputation as an active competitor in the 
market for law.  See infra Part IV.F. 
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might have, both in the general and in the corporate law markets, to re-
spond to burdensome multistate regulation by seeking protection from 
federal law.  In particular, Congress can use its broad powers over inter-
state commerce to enact federal regulation that preempts inconsistent 
state regulation.  Conversely, proregulatory interest groups might at-
tempt to prevent defeat or erosion of their regulatory interests by seek-
ing federal regulation.  Subpart D summarizes the analysis presented in 
the first three Parts of the article. 
A. The General Law Market 
Explaining the supply side of the law market not only helps explain 
why states enforce party choice of law, but also accounts for the limita-
tions on enforcing party choice.  As discussed in the following sections, 
enforcement of party choice in the general law market can be restricted 
by both the connection requirement and the fundamental policy excep-
tion.  In each case we will distinguish the incentives and resulting rules of 
states that are actively competing for law business from those of non-
competing states. 
1. Connection Requirement 
As a prerequisite to enforcing choice-of-law clauses, many courts 
require a connection between the parties or transaction and the chosen 
state.107  In contrast, no such rule exists in the market for corporate law.108  
In understanding the relationship between the corporate and general law 
markets, it is therefore important to focus on the political and policy rea-
sons for connection requirements. 
States’ motivations for imposing connection requirements can differ 
for competing and noncompeting states.  We begin with competing 
states.  Recall that a few states have enacted statutes mandating local 
court enforcement of clauses choosing their law for high-value contracts.  
Most of these statutes permit the parties to choose the enacting state’s 
law without a connection with that state.109  Though the states merely in-
vite parties to use their own laws, the statutes are still significant in invit-
ing use of the state’s law by firms all over the country.  Without a connec-
tion requirement, there is a question of what the state gains. 
One possible explanation for the absence of a connection require-
ment in these statutes concerns the role lawyers have played in promot-
ing them.110  Lawyers could be expected to favor local enforcement of 
choice-of-law clauses even if the parties lack a connection with the state 
 
 107. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 108. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 109. See supra note 76.  Florida has a slight connection requirement while Texas, which also per-
mits choice of non-Texas law, requires a reasonable connection. 
 110. See generally Ribstein, supra note 76. 
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because enforcement attracts contract litigation to the forum.  To be 
sure, transactional lawyers might instead prefer to use the statute to at-
tract the firms to the state on the theory that in-state firms are more 
likely to choose in-state lawyers.  But as long as noncompeting states’ 
courts adhere to their connection requirement, this may induce some 
firms to physically locate in the competing states in order to ensure en-
forcement of the choice-of-law clauses. 
Now consider noncompeting states’ incentives when adjudicating a 
contract designating a competing state’s law, whether or not pursuant to 
a choice-of-law statute.  Lawyers in noncompeting states derive much 
less benefit from enforcing the parties’ choice of the law of competing 
states because legal experts in the competing states are likely to have an 
edge in attracting commercial litigation and transactional business.  It 
does not necessarily follow, however, that the noncompeting state courts 
will never enforce the clause.  As discussed above,111 they have an incen-
tive not to deter firms from establishing contacts with the state.  How-
ever, noncompeting states could be expected to require as a condition of 
enforcing choice-of-law clauses that the parties have a connection with 
the state whose law is chosen.  Lawyers in noncompeting states would 
want to constrain locally based firms from sending their law business to 
one of the leading commercial jurisdictions.  If the noncompeting state 
requires a connection with the designated state as a condition of enforc-
ing the choice-of-law clause, locally based firms might be inclined to set-
tle for local law because they value their physical connection with the fo-
rum more than they value the competing state’s law.  A firm whose 
workers are basking in Arizona sun may not find it worthwhile to relo-
cate to Delaware just for the latter’s law and courts.  The noncompeting 
state therefore may be able to “bundle” its law with its more desirable 
attributes.  If so, the connection requirement allows noncompeting states 
to preserve their laws against drastic erosion by the law market. 
Although a connection requirement might serve noncompeting 
states’ interests in many cases, the rules on contractual choice of law rec-
ognize the possibility of enforcing commercial contracts without any 
connection between the parties or transaction and the chosen jurisdic-
tion.  The Second Restatement says that even absent a substantive con-
nection, another “reasonable basis” for the choice may be enough.112  
The Reporter’s Note cites the famous English case of Vita Food Prod-
ucts, Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co.,113 which enforced the contractual choice 
of otherwise unrelated English law in a contract for shipment of goods 
from Newfoundland to New York.  The parties here wanted a set of fa-
miliar laws and, perhaps, to avoid potential home court bias favoring ei-
 
 111. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2) (1971). 
 113. Vita Food Prod., Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co., Ltd., [1939] A.C. 277 (P.C. 1938) (appeal taken 
from N.S.). 
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ther side.  Obviously, courts easily could expand this exception to ac-
knowledge any of the reasons firms choose their governing laws. 
This open-ended Restatement exception makes sense in light of the 
general supply-side incentives of noncompeting states discussed in this 
article.  Recall that the connection requirement serves to protect a state’s 
law-making prerogatives by forcing firms to balance the benefits of locat-
ing in their home state against those of using the law of a competing 
state.  This could backfire where firms derive enough benefit from the 
competing state’s law that they might be willing to move if the connec-
tion requirement forces them to do so.  Such moves could impose costs 
on local lawyers and other exit-affected interest groups.  Then it may 
make sense for the noncompeting state to let the firm use the competing 
state’s law even if it lacks a connection with that state.  This may be true 
not only in cases like Vita where the parties need some neutral law, but 
also in cases where a particular jurisdiction has emerged as especially ex-
pert and unbiased. 
2. The “Fundamental Policy” Exception 
Most states will refuse to enforce chosen law if it is contrary to an 
interested state’s “fundamental policy.”  This exception carves out a 
category of “super-mandatory” rules that trump contractual provisions 
not only under local law, but also as against the law of the contractually 
selected jurisdiction.  The Restatement provides that the trumping state 
must be one that (1) would be selected under the most significant rela-
tionship test, and (2) “has a materially greater interest than the chosen 
state in the determination of the particular issue.”114  Thus, a court de-
termining whether the contractual choice is subject to a super-mandatory 
rule must consider both the nature of the policy involved (i.e., whether it 
is “fundamental”) and the level of the state’s interest in applying its pol-
icy to the relevant issue in the case. 
Like the connection requirement, rules permitting regulating states 
to trump contractual choice are both the product of and subject to the 
disciplining effects of the supply and demand forces of the law market.  
Whether a state will impose a super-mandatory rule depends on the 
presence and relative political strength of  proregulatory groups that fa-
vor the rule, antiregulatory groups that are directly burdened by the 
regulation, and the exit-affected groups that stand to lose if the super-
mandatory nature of the regulation drives firms and individuals away 
from the state.  A state’s regulation has super-mandatory effect only if 
the interest groups favoring the rule are stronger than both the antiregu-
latory and the exit-affected groups. 
 
 114. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2). 
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Consider, for example, states’ treatment of choice-of-law clauses in 
franchise contracts.  When a state chooses to regulate the ability of fran-
chisors to terminate their contracts with franchisees, the proregulatory 
group of franchisees is often stronger than the antiregulatory group of 
franchisors, who are usually based outside the state, plus the exit-affected 
group of those whose jobs or product quality are affected by franchise 
regulation.115  Employees, consumers, and others affected by a potential 
decrease in franchises or outlets have high costs of organizing politically 
relative to the benefits they could derive from this particular political ac-
tion.  In this situation, exit-affected groups remain impotent, and the leg-
islature (or court) remains free to treat franchise regulation as a super-
mandatory rule.  If, however, the exit-affected interest groups are well 
represented in the legislature, then parties are more likely to remain free 
to opt out of the regulation by choosing another state’s law. 
It follows from these law market forces that courts must distinguish 
between a merely mandatory statute, which reflects one outcome of a 
contest between these three types of interest groups, and a super-
mandatory rule, which reflects a different political balance, one in which 
exit-affected interest groups may lack strong political influence.  In fact, 
courts often seem to appreciate this distinction because they generally 
enforce choice-of-law clauses except in a limited group of cases: franchise 
and distributorship agreements, noncompetition provisions in employ-
ment contracts, loan interest rates, insurance contracts, and other con-
sumer contracts involving choice-of-law provisions in standard form 
agreements.116 
In deciding whether to override contractual choice of law, courts 
also have to determine which state’s fundamental policies will be taken 
into account.  The Second Restatement looks both to whether the trump-
ing state would be the state whose law would be chosen under the most 
significant relationship test and to whether the trumping state’s interest is 
superior to that of the chosen state.117  A firm that wants to use a choice-
of-law clause can help control whether a state’s fundamental policy will 
override the clause through its choice of location for its headquarters or 
other significant investments.  This rule therefore helps to ensure that the 
interests of exit-affected groups in both regulating and designated states 
will be taken into account in determining which rules have super-
mandatory effect. 
The competing states’ choice-of-law statutes118 allow enforcement of 
choice-of-law clauses without regard to the public policies of other states 
 
 115. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 116. See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 35, § 18.5, at 966–73; Ribstein, supra note 25, at 405–12; Gie-
sela Ruehl, Party Autonomy in the Private International Law of Contracts: Transatlantic Convergence 
and Economic Efficiency 16–20 (Comparative Research L. & Pol. Econ., CLPE Research Paper No. 
4/2007, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=921842. 
 117. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2) (1971). 
 118. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
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and even if the parties lack a local connection.  Since the statute merely 
invites the parties to use the enacting state’s law, the state is not trying to 
override other states’ policy choices.  But the statute does have the sig-
nificant effect of inviting parties from all over the country, regardless of 
lack of a local connection, to use the enacting state’s law to help ensure 
enforcement of their contracts.  This contrasts with the weighing of state 
interests under the traditional Restatement rule for enforcing choice-of-
law clauses.  As discussed above, the influence of its lawyers probably 
explains the competing state’s willingness to be accommodating.119  
Moreover, the states have only weak interests in regulating large com-
mercial contracts where the parties are closely enough matched in exper-
tise and bargaining power that they rarely need any regulatory assis-
tance, much less super-mandatory rules.  In short, for competing states, 
the prime exit-affected group of lawyers overrides any proregulatory in-
terests. 
These choice-of-law statutes do not guarantee enforcement if plain-
tiff sues outside of the competing state.  That forum may have no strong 
lawyer or other interest group that wants to attract commercial transac-
tions and litigation, and may have strong local interest groups that want 
to prevent evasion of the noncompeting state’s statute.  Although this is 
unlikely for most large commercial transactions, some categories of 
transactions, including those listed above,120 may trigger concerns within 
the noncompeting state.  On the other hand, even under the traditional 
choice-of-law analysis, the statutes may identify an “interest” of the des-
ignated state in having its law applied.  Moreover, under this article’s 
analysis, even noncompeting states may have an incentive to limit their 
use of the fundamental policy exception if applying the rule causes par-
ties to avoid the state.  Thus, the interaction between exit-affected and 
proregulatory groups may erode limits on enforcing choice-of-law clauses 
in noncompeting as well as competing states. 
B. The Corporate Law Market 
The IAD at first glance seems strikingly different from the rules 
governing choice-of-law clauses generally.  In contrast to these general 
rules, the IAD is enforced without any requirement of a connection be-
tween the corporation and the state of incorporation, and generally with-
out a “fundamental policy” exception.  However, this subpart shows that 
the differences between the IAD and the general rules governing choice-
of-law clauses are actually not as great as they seem, and can be ex-
plained by differences in the demand and supply forces across contract 
types. 
 
 119. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
 120. See supra text accompanying note 116. 
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1. Connection Requirement 
Delaware applies its corporate law to firms that have no connection 
with the state.  This follows from the supply-side of the corporate compe-
tition.121  Because of its franchise tax, Delaware’s incorporation business 
confers benefits on the state’s taxpayers regardless of whether the corpo-
ration has any contacts with the state.  Even apart from the franchise fee, 
however, Delaware lawyers would want to attract both litigation and its 
associated transactional work.  Requiring in-state connections for incor-
poration would only limit the local lawyers’ market.  Thus, the IAD rule 
operates according to incentives that are similar to those that produced 
the competing states’ choice-of-law statutes for high-value commercial 
transactions which similarly lack a connection requirement.122 
It might seem harder to explain why courts outside of Delaware also 
apply the IAD even to firms that lack a connection with the incorporat-
ing state.  But this too makes sense given the general law market forces 
described in this article.  First, the IAD can be analyzed as an extension 
of the Vita exception to the connection requirement123 applied to choice 
of corporate law.  Consistent with our analysis of that exception, firms 
gain so much from being able to contract for corporate governance law 
that noncompeting states fear firms’ moving their home offices or avoid-
ing contacts with them if they imposed a connection requirement. 
Second, even if these risks of losing firms by imposing a connection 
requirement are only slight, noncompeting states also have little to gain 
from insisting on a connection requirement.  As discussed in the next 
subpart, most important policy questions concerning corporate govern-
ance are not covered by the IAD.  Restrictions on party choice of law 
typically require strong interest-group support.  With little demand to 
protect the few mandatory rules that fall within the IAD, restrictions on 
contractual choice, including the connection requirement, are unlikely. 
2. Fundamental Policy Exception: The IAD as Optical Illusion 
Even if firm mobility and lawyers’ interests encourage enforcement 
of the IAD, other local interest groups often would rather have the state 
apply local regulation than the more permissive law of another state.  
The presence of these competing interests explains the “fundamental 
policy” exception to enforcement of choice-of-law clauses for contracts 
generally.  Yet the courts do not recognize such an exception for the 
IAD.  This seems odd in light of the controversies perennially raging in 
Congress and in the press about corporate governance, some of which 
include the Enron-era scandals, executive compensation, shareholder 
 
 121. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 122. See supra Part I.D. 
 123. See supra text accompanying note 113. 
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voting, fraud, and protection of nonshareholder “stakeholders.”  These 
controversies, though heated, have not yet threatened the IAD.  Politi-
cally powerful groups like organized labor, for example, could seek to 
shape corporate law to promote their interests, and it might seem that 
protecting labor’s interests would require relaxing the IAD to protect 
employees outside the incorporating state.  Shareholder interests are 
probably too diffuse to block such regulation even if it reduced share-
holder wealth.124  So why is there no fundamental policy exception to the 
IAD? 
It is not surprising that Delaware, the leading corporate jurisdiction, 
has few mandatory corporate rules.  Delaware is small enough that its in-
corporation fees really matter to its fiscal health, while it lacks the inter-
est groups that might agitate for enforcing local public policies against 
foreign corporations.  This was also true in New Jersey when it began 
competing for charters. 
The puzzle concerning the lack of super-mandatory corporate rules 
concerns states other than Delaware that are called on to apply the IAD 
to Delaware corporations doing business locally.  The explanation for 
Delaware’s passivity applies to few other states.  For example, by the 
time Wilson became governor of New Jersey, that state was developing 
industries and alternative sources of revenue, and through these indus-
tries was also feeling the costs of monopolization its laws were imposing 
elsewhere.125  Why, then, is the IAD enforced without the usual “funda-
mental policy” exceptions outside of Delaware?  Surely courts and legis-
latures could, if they wanted to, view at least ordinary investors who own 
shares in publicly traded corporations as equivalent to the unsophisti-
cated individuals who are protected by super-mandatory rules in other 
contexts. 
At least two factors can explain the absence of a fundamental policy 
exception to the IAD.  First, there is only weak pressure for super-
mandatory corporate governance rules.  Consider the positions of groups 
that would be most interested in the sort of corporate governance issues 
covered by the IAD—shareholders and creditors.  In the early days of 
the private corporation, before strong public securities markets, share-
holders would have been able to protect themselves through voting pro-
visions in corporate charters.  When public securities markets developed, 
dispersed and passive shareholders might have needed legal protection 
from strong managers.  But noncontrolling shareholders were a diffuse 
group, with no organizations that could have coordinated their lobbying.  
Similarly, creditors might have needed protection from owners’ manipu-
lation of corporate assets, particularly after legislatures and courts recog-
nized limited liability of shareholders for corporate debts.  But banks and 
other large creditors could insist on contractual protection, while small 
 
 124. See Coates, supra note 68 (discussing the potential influence of these interest groups). 
 125. See Grandy, supra note 59. 
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trade creditors were no more able than shareholders to coordinate politi-
cally.  Tort creditors, such as accident victims, were weak until trial law-
yers became a potent force in speaking for them, by which time corpo-
rate features were well established, accounting and disclosure technology 
provided significant protection for creditors,126 and trial lawyers had 
plenty of corporate assets to go after.  In short, possible legal protections 
often proved either unnecessary or unattainable. 
Second, any pressure for legal protections that does exist has been 
channeled off into rules outside the area covered by the IAD.  In other 
words, the IAD is a sort of optical illusion: it looks absolute because its 
scope has been limited to the area in which it can operate absolutely.  
Most public policy concerns are expressed through laws that do not fall 
within the IAD itself.  For example, organized labor seeks employee pro-
tections in labor law.  Constraints on corporate size once imposed by the 
capital limits of early special charters127 were left to the antitrust laws.  
Creditors’ direct rights against the firm are contained in the loan agree-
ments and are therefore subject to conflict of laws principles that apply 
to contracts generally.  In contrast to internal governance matters like 
shareholder voting, the benefits of being able to choose a single firmwide 
rule are lower for agreements with creditors.  The IAD is limited to cov-
ering creditor-protection rules that concern shareholders’ financial rights, 
including shareholders’ personal liability for corporate harms, obligations 
to commit their capital to the firm, and restrictions on distributions to 
owners that increase the risk that the firm will not be able to pay its 
debts.  These rules mostly affect smaller creditors who, as discussed 
above in this section, are less powerful as an interest group than the 
combination of the antiregulatory and exit-affected interest groups that 
support the IAD. 
Consider also states’ securities, or “blue sky,” statutes that specify 
disclosure rules for securities transactions.  These laws apply to transac-
tions occurring in the state,128 which is often the investor’s home state, re-
gardless of the location of the company’s incorporation.  This exception 
to the IAD can be explained partly by the lower costs of enforcing local 
law in this situation: local actions by investors do not threaten firmwide 
governance rules such as those dealing with shareholder voting.  More-
over, in contrast to the relatively weak interest groups that might oppose 
the IAD, strong interest groups really cared about state securities regula-
tion in the early twentieth century.  Proregulation groups here included 
relatively well-organized regional securities firms and local banks that 
feared the big New York investment banks.129  More recently, trial law-
 
 126. See generally Henry Hansmann et al., Law and the Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1333 
(2006). 
 127. See Tung, supra note 9, at 61. 
 128. See UNIF. SEC. ACT § 610, 7C U.L.A. 207 (2006). 
 129. See Macey & Miller, supra note 94 (discussing the influence of small banks and local indus-
tries on the enactment of blue sky laws). 
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yers have promoted state securities regulation as an end-run around fed-
eral restrictions on securities fraud claims.130 
Ethics rules for professional firms also lie outside the IAD.  In gen-
eral, ethics rules regulate the conduct of individual professionals based 
on where they practice and are not really part of “corporate” law.  But 
some professional ethics rules, such as those specifying the members’ vi-
carious liability for the firm’s debts, have at least as much impact on the 
firm’s governance as the rules that are subject to the IAD.131  A publicly 
held corporation, therefore, may not practice law in the United States 
and accountants and other professionals may not co-own a law firm.  The 
persistence of these rules can be explained by the power of professional 
groups who want to restrict competition.  For example, the rule restrict-
ing who may own the firm’s shares protects professionals from having 
bosses who do not share their interests.132  Because professional groups 
are among the most powerful and cohesive interest groups, they would 
be formidable opponents of enforcing contractual choice of law.133 
These exceptions to the IAD show that corporate governance, if 
broadly construed to include matters that are technically outside the 
IAD, actually is subject to the same anti-contractual-choice pressures 
that affect other types of contracts.  The success of opponents of contrac-
tual choice depends on the same factors that matter elsewhere in the law 
market, including the benefits of contractual choice, the costs and bene-
fits of exit, and, as discussed in the next subpart, the role of federal law in 
mitigating the costs imposed by multiple state regulators.  The only dif-
ference is that the exceptions have developed outside the IAD, thereby 
preserving the apparent absoluteness of the doctrine. 
 
 130. See Larry E. Ribstein, Dabit, Preemption, and Choice of Law, 2006 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 141, 
146 [hereinafter Ribstein, Dabit, Preemption, and Choice of Law].  There is a separate question 
whether firms and investors should be able to choose the applicable securities law.  See Stephen J. 
Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of Securities 
Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903 (1997) (arguing for allowing this choice); Roberta Romano, Em-
powering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998) [hereinaf-
ter Romano, Empowering Investors] (same).  This would not necessarily lead to a race to the bottom: 
firms have voluntary “bonded” the accuracy and completeness of their disclosures by voluntarily sub-
jecting themselves to higher disclosure standards than in their home countries.  See Larry E. Ribstein, 
Cross-Listing and Regulatory Competition, 1 REV. L. & ECON. 97 (2005) [hereinafter Ribstein, Cross-
Listing and Regulatory Competition], available at http://www.bepress.com/rle/vol1/iss1/art7.  Also, se-
curities prices have been shown to reflect disclosure differences across countries.  See Roberta 
Romano, The Need For Competition In International Securities Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES 
L. 387 (2001) [hereinafter Romano, The Need for Competition] (summarizing studies), available at 
http://bepress.com/til/default/vol2/iss2/art1. 
 131. For a discussion of the effect and politics of these rules in the law firm setting, see Larry E. 
Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Law Firm Structure and Choice of Law, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 1161 (2001). 
 132. See Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Agency Costs and Law Firm Structure, 84 VA. L. REV. 
1707, 1721 (1998). 
 133. As with creditor and securities rules, there is a separate question whether there should be 
jurisdictional competition as to ethical rules as well. 
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C. The Federal Role 
No examination of the IAD would be complete without considering 
the important role of federal law.  We have seen that states may impose 
super-mandatory rules in the general law market and similarly regulate 
corporate governance in significant ways outside the IAD.134  When these 
laws threaten to subject national firms to numerous state regulators, 
business groups may lobby for a single federal law to regulate the area 
and preempt inconsistent state laws.  Conversely, proregulatory groups 
may lobby for federal regulation that supersedes the IAD, or other 
treatment of contractual choice of law, in order to facilitate super-
mandatory state or federal laws.  Thus, federal law is part of the optical 
illusion of the IAD: it provides another way to move contentious issues, 
such as bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, and other laws that otherwise 
might trigger exceptions to the IAD, outside the scope of that rule.135 
Consider, for example, the federal government’s role in protecting 
creditors of insolvent corporations.  Although the IAD generally applies 
in this area,136 federal law creates certain deviations from the IAD.  A 
bankrupt firm is managed by the trustee in bankruptcy, which may be the 
corporation’s managers if the corporation is being reorganized under 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.137  Some bankruptcy courts have al-
lowed creditors to sue shareholders or managers derivatively on behalf of 
the insolvent corporation if the trustee in bankruptcy refuses to bring the 
suit.138  If the court allows the suit, it effectively subjects corporate man-
agement to federal bankruptcy law rather than the law of the state of in-
corporation.  For example, some cases suggest that the corporation or its 
managers may have a special federal fiduciary duty to creditors that tran-
scends the creditors’ specific rights under their loan agreement or state 
law.139 
The federal role in corporate governance is particularly important 
because of its potentially dynamic effect.  Once Congress has passed a 
law, firms may press the courts to expand the law’s preemptive effect, 
and thereby slowly erode state law.  Although the Supreme Court gener-
 
 134. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 135. See Mark Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003) (discussing the in-
creasing federalization of corporate law). 
 136. See, e.g., Prod. Res. Group v. NCT Group, 863 A.2d 772 (Del. Ch. 2004). 
 137. Keith Sharfman, Derivative Suits in Bankruptcy, 10 STAN. J.L. & FIN. 24 (2004). 
 138. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548 
(3d Cir. 2003) (allowing creditors committee to sue derivatively); In re Commodore Int’l Ltd., 262 F.3d 
96 (2d Cir. 2001) (also allowing creditors committee to sue derivatively with the approval of the bank-
ruptcy court).  Others have questioned the right to bring such an action under the Bankruptcy Code.  
See In re Fox, 305 B.R. 912 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2004) (denying standing to bring a § 548 claim); 
Sharfman, supra note 137 (discussing cases and questioning availability of derivative remedy). 
 139. For a critique of these cases, see Larry E. Ribstein & Kelli Alces, Directors’ Duties in Failing 
Firms, J. BUS. & TECH. L. (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=880074. 
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ally has presumed against preempting state law,140 it has departed from 
that presumption in areas of the law dominated by federal regulation, 
such as securities law.141 
So far the federal government generally has stayed out of issues the 
states have chosen to keep within the IAD.  Thus, a move in 1914 to con-
sider federal chartering of corporations ended with a failed proposal for 
federal licensing or franchising that would have preserved state incorpo-
ration.142  By this time, because the IAD was widely accepted, there was 
no need for federal law to protect firms from multiple state laws.  How-
ever, the federal government’s quiescence as to issues falling within the 
IAD may not continue.  Congress responded to Enron and related scan-
dals with the broadest federal regulation of corporate governance since 
the Depression—the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.143  Federal regulation in this 
area might continue to expand in response either to state super-
mandatory laws or to the perceived inadequacy of state regulation. 
The risk of federal government action might cause proregulatory in-
terest groups to pause before seeking state regulation that could moti-
vate antiregulatory groups to seek federal preemption.  Because the risk 
of federal action may depend on whether state regulations impose costs 
on firms outside the state, interest groups have some incentive to limit 
their regulatory initiatives to those that mainly affect firms that are 
closely connected to the state.  The potential for federal action also might 
cause antiregulatory groups to accede to state regulation of corporate 
governance that, while imposing new burdens, is less costly than broad-
ening federal regulation.  When Congress preempts state law, it com-
pletely ousts the states from regulating in that area.  Interest groups act-
ing at the state level must constantly balance the benefits they derive 
from enacting particular regulation against the possibility of losing their 
jurisdiction entirely.  In this sense, state law operates in the shadow of 
federal law.144 
D. Summary 
The market for corporate law is not as different from that for con-
tract law generally as it might seem at first glance.  In both cases parties 
demand the benefits of contractual choice of law, and they make that 
demand felt in the law market through their basic ability to move among 
jurisdictions.  Exit-affected interest groups, particularly lawyers, respond 
 
 140. See Bates v. Dow AgroSciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 
U.S. 470, 485 (1996). 
 141. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 87–89 (2006). 
 142. See MITCHELL, supra note 65, ch. 5. 
 143. See Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 
116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 18 U.S.C.). 
 144. For an analogous point, see Roe, supra note 135 (arguing that Delaware in effect competes 
with federal law because of the threat of federal preemption). 
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by pressuring state governments to allow parties to shop for law.  In both 
cases the market is limited by state regulation that trumps contractual 
choice in particular situations, and by federal law that preempts state law 
when multiple state regulations threaten to impede national trade.  The 
one apparent distinction between the corporate and the general mar-
kets—the fact that the IAD requires no connection between the parties 
or transaction and the designated state—is readily explained by the same 
political considerations that underlie the general law market.  Moreover, 
the general law market also dispenses with the connection requirement 
in equivalent circumstances.  Thus, it is misleading to examine the corpo-
rate law market as a distinct phenomenon, and much more intellectually 
profitable to understand the common forces underlying markets for cor-
porate as well as other contract law. 
IV. THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATE LAW MARKET 
The academic writing on the corporate law market has so far fo-
cused on a relatively narrow slice of that market occupied by publicly 
held corporations.  Scholars have argued over whether this slice involves 
a “race to the bottom,” as William Cary suggested.145  The literature sug-
gests that the competition for the provision of corporate law is defective 
because of Delaware’s overwhelming market share.  Moreover, Dela-
ware’s dominance seems to be abetted by the IAD, which permits corpo-
rate law to be divorced from the place of operation. 
This Part shows that the debate has drawn a misleading picture of 
the corporate law market.  We provide a corrective by broadening the 
analysis to discuss the markets for many types of business associations 
and analogous entity-creating or -modifying contracts.  Here we turn 
from a discussion of the development of the IAD to a discussion of the 
market for corporate law that has developed as a result of the IAD.  We 
show that the processes discussed in Parts I–III above are at work 
throughout the many aspects of the law market.  While the processes 
have different consequences in each setting, their important role in dif-
ferent contexts suggests that the corporate law market is shaped by these 
ongoing market and political forces rather than being the inevitable re-
sult of particular historical circumstances or legal rules.  As discussed be-
low in Part V, this analysis has important policy and theoretical implica-
tions. 
Subpart A begins on conventional ground by discussing publicly 
held corporations.  This subpart undercuts the notion that Delaware’s 
apparent dominance sets the market for publicly held corporation law 
apart from the processes we have described.  Subparts B, C, and D de-
scribe other business associations that are subject to versions of the IAD, 
 
 145. See supra text accompanying note 1. 
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including closely held business associations, publicly held unincorporated 
firms, and European corporations.  Subparts E, F, and G discuss markets 
that are not subject to the IAD but nevertheless involve processes similar 
to those operating in corporate and general law markets: international 
securities regulation, commercial contracts, and trusts.  Subpart H sum-
marizes the implications of this Part’s analysis. 
A. Publicly Held Corporations 
Given scholars’ focus on the market for publicly held corporations, 
it is not surprising that the corporate law market seems unique.  Dela-
ware overwhelmingly leads all other states by incorporating more than 
half of public corporations.146  Delaware’s dominance is reflected in the 
profits it makes from its franchise fees.  No other aspect of the law mar-
ket operates through a franchise fee mechanism.  However, we have 
shown that even the Delaware phenomenon can be explained by the 
general forces underlying the law market.  Elsewhere in this Part we will 
show that Delaware dominates only one aspect of the corporate law 
market.  Here we will show that Delaware’s leading role in the market 
for publicly held corporations does not imply the absence of a viable 
market for law even with respect to this corner of the law market. 
Several possible reasons have been given for Delaware’s domi-
nance.147  First, Delaware may have the sort of “network” advantages 
that have been attributed to, for example, computer operating systems.148  
The many Delaware corporations produce cases and common practices, 
and those practices help to clarify contract terms over time.149  These ad-
vantages can “lock in” Delaware law against even more efficient com-
petitors.150  Second, Delaware offers a legal “infrastructure” consisting of 
 
 146. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate 
Law?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1775, 1810 (2002) (finding Delaware’s share to be fifty-eight percent of publicly 
traded nonfinancial firms). 
 147. See id. at 1784–97 (reviewing these explanations). 
 148. See Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 332, 334–36 
(1985). 
 149. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the 
Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261, 286–89 (1985). 
 150. For discussions of the network externalities and related theories in the context of business 
associations, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate 
Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1999); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Anti-
takeover Provisions in Bonds: Bondholder Protection or Management Entrenchment?, 40 UCLA L. 
REV. 931 (1993); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting: In-
creasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347 (1996); Marcel Kahan & 
Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or “The Economics of 
Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713 (1997); Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Net-
works of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757 (1995).  See also Ehud Kamar, Beyond Competition for Incor-
porations, 94 GEO. L.J. 1725 (2006) (arguing that Delaware’s legal indeterminacy enables it to increase 
network effects and thereby to hold onto its dominant position).  For skepticism about the network 
externalities theory, see S. J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, The Fable of the Keys, 33 J.L. & ECON. 
1 (1990); S. J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy, 8 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 133 (1994) (showing that it may be impossible to tell whether a product, or corporate 
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the country’s most expert corporate court and bar.  A would-be competi-
tor would have to make a large investment in developing such an infra-
structure.151 Meanwhile, Delaware could quickly respond to any other 
state’s attempt to actively compete with it.152  Third, a competitor state 
also would have to provide assurances as to its future lawmaking and ad-
judication.  An important function of corporate law is its ability to 
change over time.  Because amending a public corporation’s charter is a 
costly and cumbersome process, it may be hard for corporations to 
change their contracts to efficiently account for changing circumstances 
that a firm will face over its long life.  Firms, therefore, must trust the 
state to make necessary changes.153  At the same time, corporations must 
hope that the state’s politicians do not change the corporation laws in 
ways that reduce corporate wealth—as New Jersey did when it enacted 
its antitrust law at the beginning of the 20th century.  Delaware’s de-
pendence on franchise taxes uniquely “bonds” its commitment to avoid 
similar compromises.154 
Delaware’s dominance matters because of its possible effect on the 
efficiency of the state competition for corporate law.  This dominance is 
the current turn in the debate William Cary began with his “race to the 
bottom” paper.155  Commentators responded that efficient securities 
markets discipline firms’ choice of state of incorporation.156  But an effi-
cient securities market can only discipline the choice among available 
competitors.  Firms’ positive reaction to Delaware incorporation there-
 
statute, is losing the competition because users like to stick with an inferior product’s “network,” or 
just because the winning product is actually superior).  For skepticism about the application of the 
theory to corporate law, see Romano, supra note 130, at 514–19.  For evidence that the network exter-
nalities theory did not prevent development of a new type of closely held business association, see 
Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Choice of Form and Network Externalities, 43 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 79 (2001). 
 151. Note, however, that the investment may not be large compared to a state’s overall budget.  
Kahan & Kamar, supra note 97, at 725, suggest it would cost less than $2 million a year. 
 152. See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 88, at 585–95. 
 153. See Henry Hansmann, Corporation and Contract, 8 AM. L. ECON. REV. 1, 7–10 (2006). 
 154. See Roberta Romano, Law as Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J. L. 
ECON. & ORG. 225, 231 (1985). 
 155. Cary, supra note 1; see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The De-
sirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435 (1992). 
 156. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 212–18 (1991); Daniel R. Fischel, The “Race to the Bottom” Revisited: Reflections on 
Recent Developments in Delaware’s Corporation Law, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 913, 918–19 (1982); Romano, 
supra note 154, at 229–30; Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of 
the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 256 (1977).  There is evidence that the stock market rewards 
firms that reincorporate in Delaware from another jurisdiction.  See Peter Dodd & Richard Leftwich, 
The Market for Corporate Charters: “Unhealthy Competition” Versus Federal Regulation, 53 J. BUS. 
259, 274–75 (1980); Romano, The Need for Competition, supra note 130, at 495–97 (reviewing eight 
studies finding positive abnormal stock returns from changing incorporation state); Romano, supra 
note 154, at 232.  There is also evidence that the market gives a higher value to Delaware corporations 
than firms incorporated in other states.  See Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm 
Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525, 527 (2001) (documenting that Delaware firms had higher “Tobin’s Q’s” 
than non-Delaware firms in a study covering the period 1981–1996). 
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fore may be attributable not to the high quality of Delaware law, but to 
the fact that the market produces few competitors.157 
Although Delaware undoubtedly has a significant market share of 
incorporations of public firms, this does not mean the market is not com-
petitive.  Delaware attracts about fifty percent of incorporations by new 
public firms,158 and a little more than half of all publicly traded corpora-
tions,159 with most of the rest incorporating in their home states.  Given 
Delaware’s supposed significant competitive advantages, one might ask 
why Delaware’s dominance in these areas is not greater.  Scholars have 
offered several explanations, most of which are skeptical of the existence 
of a healthy competition for corporate law.160  For example, Robert 
Daines presents evidence showing that the choice of the home state cor-
relates with the use of a local rather than national law firm.161  But corre-
lation is not necessarily causation.  Firms may be choosing their lawyers 
based on their incorporation choices.  There is also evidence that states 
use antitakeover statutes to attract incorporations,162 and competing evi-
dence that firms are seeking flexible rules and high-quality judicial sys-
tems rather than takeover protection.163  Michael Klausner concludes that 
the evidence overall does not support a vigorous competition for corpo-
rate law.164 
Despite these scholars’ skepticism, competition with home states for 
incorporation business may be enough to provide realistic market disci-
pline for corporate law.165  This is indicated by the facts that corporate 
law innovations spread through the states in the same way that innova-
tions in competitive markets have been shown to spread,166 and that 
states earn franchise revenues in proportion to their willingness to re-
spond to changes in the market with innovative legislation.167  However, 
the franchise tax cannot explain why non-Delaware states would seek to 
keep their locally based corporations from incorporating in Delaware.  
 
 157. See Oren Bar-Gill, Michal Barzuza & Lucian Bebchuk, The Market for Corporate Law, 162 
J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 134 passim (2006); Kahan & Kamar, supra note 97, at 685–
86. 
 158. See Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 1571 
(2002). 
 159. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 146, at 1810. 
 160. See Michael Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A Generation Later,  31 
J. CORP. L. 779, 786–89 (2006) (reviewing the literature). 
 161. Daines, supra note 158. 
 162. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46 J.L. & 
ECON. 383, 387 (2003). 
 163. See Marcel Kahan, The Demand for Corporate Law: Statutory Flexibility, Judicial Quality, or 
Takeover Protection?, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 340 (2006). 
 164. See Klausner, supra note 160, at 797. 
 165. See Romano, supra note 154, at 226. 
 166. See Carney, supra note 94, at 720, 734; Roberta Romano, The States as a Laboratory: Legal 
Innovation and State Competition for Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 209, 231 (2006) (show-
ing rapid diffusion of corporate law changes, but resistance to anti-takeover laws in Delaware as com-
pared with states where labor has more influence). 
 167. See Romano, supra note 166, at 236–40. 
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Delaware is one of only a couple of states that charge a fee based on the 
size of the corporation (most importantly, according to the number of 
shares) and for which franchise taxes provide enough profit to motivate 
the state to compete.168  Where franchise fees are a tiny part of the 
budget, taxpayers would care little about attracting incorporations.  In 
fact, states compete, in part, because their lawyers have strong incentives 
to keep corporations at home, and thereby increase the value of local le-
gal expertise, rather than sending corporations off to Delaware lawyers.  
In other words, the influence of lawyers explains the competition for 
corporate law just as it helps explain the supply side of the noncorporate 
competition. 
A study of the corporate law market as a piece of the overall market 
for law can contribute to this debate over Delaware’s dominance.  As 
discussed so far in this article, the corporate law market and the rules 
governing it are driven by the same forces that underlie competition for 
other law.  Exit-affected groups in corporations’ home states will not 
readily cede the advantages of attracting public incorporations.  These 
groups include not only lawyers, but also those who benefit from corpo-
rations’ local headquarters or other connections.  As we will see below in 
subpart F, firms’ incorporation at home arguably supports this link be-
tween the corporate and general law markets insofar as they seek the ad-
vantages of local contract law, and not just local corporate law.  In this 
sense Delaware’s corporate law competes in the market for contracts. 
B. Closely Held Business Associations 
An important question for present purposes is whether Delaware’s 
apparent dominance indicates that there is something special about the 
corporate law market.  In fact, this phenomenon of dominance by a sin-
gle state exists only for publicly held firms in the U.S. federal system and 
not in other contexts in which the IAD is applied.  Indeed, the market for 
closely held firms looks quite different from the market for publicly held 
firms.  Although the IAD traditionally was linked to the corporate form, 
and therefore did not traditionally apply to unincorporated firms,169 this 
has changed significantly over the last generation.  Choice-of-law clauses 
are now enforced so commonly in general partnerships that the rule 
closely resembles the IAD.170  The same is true regarding the market for 
 
 168. See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 88, at 556; Kahan & Kamar, supra note 97, at 724–26. 
 169. See Jennifer J. Johnson, Risky Business: Choice-of-Law and the Unincorporated Entity, 1 J. 
SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 249, 275 (1997); Ribstein, supra note 14, at 268; see also Thomas E. 
Rutledge, To Boldly Go Where You Have Not Been Told You May Go: LLCs, LLPs, and LLLPs in 
Interstate Transactions, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 205, 213 (2006). 
 170. See ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP 
§ 1.04 (1988 & Supp.).  However, in the absence of a clear statutory rule, the common law of conflict-
of-laws may apply.  The common law may apply the general contract choice-of-law rule rather than the 
IAD if the firm is a partnership, though probably not if it is an LLC.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 298 (defining “corporation” for choice-of-law purposes).  It is conceivable that 
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limited liability partnership-type entities such as the limited liability 
company (LLC), to which the IAD also has been applied.171  Thus, not-
withstanding the IAD, the usual supply and demand forces that underlie 
the law market are at work for firms’ choice of governing law.  The rela-
tive influence of differing choices is due to different competitive condi-
tions in each of these submarkets. 
The market does not, however, resemble that for public corporation 
law.  Several factors impede the development of a Delaware-type market 
for “tramp” closely held firms.  Closely held firms’ costs of operating 
outside the formation state, which include paying a foreign-firm fee for 
operating at home, are likely to be high compared to the money invested 
in the firm.172  Conversely, publicly held firms must operate as foreign 
firms in some states whether or not they incorporate in their residence 
state, and so have low marginal costs of shopping for law.173 
More importantly, publicly held firms get higher benefits than do 
closely held firms from the “network” of corporate law.174  Publicly held 
firms face the prospect of many shareholder suits in which such law will 
be applied.  Closely held firms, by contrast, are likely to endure such a 
suit only once, when the relationship falls apart.  Publicly held firms also 
benefit from being on the same standard with other publicly held firms 
because this facilitates trading of their shares in public securities markets.  
These factors mean that public corporations are willing to pay Delaware 
enough to give it an incentive to maintain a substantial infrastructure, 
and to post a “bond” to secure the future direction of its law.175 
Notwithstanding these differences between publicly and closely held 
firms, there is evidence that states have actively competed to supply the 
law of closely held unincorporated firms, particularly including LLCs, 
and that this competition has led to efficient legal rules.176  Although 
 
applying the contract rule may mean that partner’s liability is governed by the law of the plaintiff’s 
residence rather than that of the state of formation.  See id. § 298.  See generally Rutledge, supra note 
169, at 238–42. 
 171. See LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON LIMITED 
LIABILITY COMPANIES § 13:4 (2d ed. 2004). 
 172. See Ian Ayres, Judging Close Corporations in the Age of Statutes, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 365, 374–
75 (1992); Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 88, at 573 (showing evidence that larger firms are more 
likely than smaller firms to incorporate outside home state). 
 173. Roberta Romano, State Competition for Close Corporation Charters: A Commentary, 70 
WASH. U. L.Q. 409, 413 (1992) (arguing that there is relatively little competition for such firms be-
cause the transaction cost benefits of closely held firm statutes are relatively low). 
 174. See supra text accompanying note 148. 
 175. For a formal model of the attributes of the market for corporations which stresses the differ-
ence between firms that do and do not demand significant infrastructure, see Oren Bar-Gill et al., su-
pra note 157. 
 176. See Carol R. Goforth, The Rise of the Limited Liability Company: Evidence of a Race Be-
tween the States, But Heading Where?, 45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1193 (1995) (showing evidence that law-
yers and others participated in competition regarding LLC laws); Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Rib-
stein, Evolution and Spontaneous Uniformity: Evidence from the Evolution of the Limited Liability 
Company, 34 ECON. INQUIRY 464 (1996) (showing evidence of evolution of state LLC statutes toward 
efficient level of uniformity); Larry E. Ribstein, Statutory Forms for Closely Held Firms: Theories and 
Evidence from LLCs, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 369, 430–31 (1995). 
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there is no equivalent to Delaware in the closely held firm market, data 
on LLC formations in 2005 indicate that Florida has emerged as a clear 
leader, with Delaware next but far behind Florida, and several states 
bunched not far behind Delaware.177  The leadership of Delaware and 
Florida in LLC formations does not reflect their standing in population 
relative to other states.178 
The Florida data suggests that in the market for closely held firms a 
dominant state emerges by promoting both basic business activity and 
business formations.  Florida’s investment attractions include an active 
real estate market, fueled by retirement, tourism, and a large homestead 
exemption for sheltering debt from bankruptcy;179 a thriving small service 
business in the real estate, tourist, and retirement industries; an estate 
planning industry generated by Florida’s large retirement community; 
and an important destination for Latin American immigrants.  The Flor-
ida bar has used the LLC form to exploit these advantages in a number 
of ways, including by making it tax friendly, reducing fees, and crafting 
the statute to fit estate planning and asset protection needs.180  The pay-
off of these efforts and factors is that, according to data from the Florida 
Secretary of State, formations of Florida LLCs increased from 1892 for-
mations in 1996 to 130,558 in 2005, an increase of 6900%.  Meanwhile, 
formations of for-profit Florida corporations during the same period in-
creased from 104,173 to 168,182, or 62%.181 
It is not clear how to separate Florida’s supply of law for corporate 
and LLC formations from its role in attracting investments.  Florida’s at-
 
 177. Specifically, Florida had 123,437 formations that year, followed by Delaware at 87,360.  Data 
on LLC formations is compiled by the International Association of Corporate Administrators.  INT’L 
ASS’N OF COMMERCIAL ADM’RS, ANNUAL REPORT OF JURISDICTIONS 39–48 (2005), available at 
http://www.iaca.org/downloads/AnnualReports/2006_AR.pdf. 
 178. Other leading states include California (59,431), Texas (53,101), New Jersey (51,668), Ari-
zona (48,663), New York (48,564), Colorado (45,302), Georgia (41,063), and Ohio (40,180).  Florida is 
fourth in population after California, Texas, and New York.  See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, RESIDENT 
POPULATION OF THE 50 STATES, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, AND PUERTO RICO: CENSUS 2000 
(2000), available at http://www.census.gov/population/cen2000/tab02.pdf. 
 179. The Florida homestead exemption, which is ensconced in a constitutional provision, protects 
an unlimited value of property provided that it occupies no more than a half acre within a municipality 
or 160 acres outside of a municipality.  See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4. 
 180. Florida revised its statute in 1999 and 2002 to increase usability, particularly for small firms 
and as retirement and debt-protection vehicles.  These revisions, among other things, clarified provi-
sions for single member LLCs, clarified veil-piercing standards, removed the requirement to estimate 
capital contributions, ensured lack of marketability and minority interest discounts for use in estate 
planning, and offered debtor protection by denying creditors the right to foreclose on charging orders.  
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.433 (West 2007) (denying creditors the right to foreclose on charging or-
ders); id. § 608.701 (applying corporate veil piercing case law to LLC context); id. § 608.4211 (remov-
ing requirement to estimate capital contributions); see also id. §§ 608.401–.705; Florida Asset Protec-
tion Blog, http://floridaassetprotection.blogs.com/alperlaw/2005/01/thoughts_about_html (Jan. 11, 
2005) (noting that “the Florida legislature changed the law to specifically permit a single member 
LLC”).  For example, until fairly recently, non-foreclosure on charging orders was an asset protection 
provision.  See Larry E. Ribstein, Reverse Limited Liability and the Design of Business Associations, 30 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 199 (2005). 
 181. See Florida Division of Corporations Annual Statistics, http://webarchive.org/web/2006/ 
109034657/http://www.dos.state.fl.us/doc/corp_stat.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2008). 
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tractive business environment might have drawn investments even from 
firms that are organized elsewhere.  On the other hand, Florida’s activi-
ties in drawing investments might have motivated it also to try to attract 
business formations, since it could expect that firms that were already 
based in Florida would be inclined to invest there.  Thus, Florida might 
be competing simultaneously in a chartering market for closely held 
firms and in a state market for investments.  The Florida evidence there-
fore indicates that there may be no clear separation between the “un-
bundled” corporate market for law alone and the “bundled” market for 
law and other attributes of establishing connections with a state.  While it 
is not clear precisely what factors are driving Florida’s success, the data 
suggest the importance of further studying the law market in the light of 
the general forces driving the market for law rather than the supposedly 
unique characteristics of the market for corporate law. 
C. The Market for Publicly Held Unincorporated Firms 
The LLC formation data indicate that the Delaware phenomenon 
depends on the publicly held nature of the entity rather than on the type 
of business association.  This suggests that Delaware should be dominant 
in the market for publicly held unincorporated firms as well.  And, in-
deed, Delaware does dominate the market for publicly held or “master” 
limited partnerships.182  Delaware does not, however, dominate the mar-
ket for all types of publicly held firms.  Other states have shown that they 
can take over submarkets for specific types of publicly held firms by tai-
loring their statutes to these firms’ needs.  Again, the underlying supply 
and demand forces in the market for law account for the structure of the 
market. 
With respect to statutory business trusts, Massachusetts is a close 
competitor with Delaware in the number of firms (although Delaware 
has a significant lead in new formations of these firms).183  Most mutual 
funds are either Massachusetts business trusts or Maryland corporations, 
although Delaware statutory trusts are rapidly catching up.184  Maryland 
has nearly all of the market for real estate investment trusts (REITs) and 
has always led in providing a statutory vehicle for these instruments.185  
Among other things, Maryland has no franchise tax and offers takeover 
 
 182. See generally John Goodgame, Master Limited Partnership Governance, 60 BUS. LAW. 471 
(2005). 
 183. In The Rise of the Statutory Business Trust (in progress), Robert H. Sitkoff shows that in 2005 
Delaware had 14,164 of these firms, Massachusetts 10,535, and Connecticut 1529, though Delaware 
had far more formations of these firms than both other states—3200, compared to a total of 262 in the 
other states. 
 184. Id. (relying on data from the Investment Company Institute).  Many closed end funds are 
Delaware limited partnerships, bringing Delaware’s total entity share in that category close to the 
shares of Massachusetts and Maryland. 
 185. See David M. Einhorn et al., REIT M&A Transactions—Peculiarities and Complications, 55 
BUS. LAW. 693, 698 n.26 (2000). 
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protection, shareholder restrictions, director powers, and other provi-
sions that are specially tailored to REITS.186 
These types of firms share the characteristic that their terms are 
heavily governed by federal law, including the Investment Company Act 
of 1940187 for mutual funds formed as statutory business trusts and the 
REIT provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.188  In these narrow and 
heavily regulated areas, Delaware’s unique lawmaking advantages are 
less important.  These firms, therefore, would be less inclined than pub-
licly held corporations to pay Delaware’s substantial franchise fee, and 
cheaper states can emerge as dominant. 
These niche business associations are another indication of the 
IAD’s relatively small role in determining the shape of the corporate law 
market.  Not only is Delaware not dominant outside of the publicly held 
firm context, but even within this context it faces effective competition in 
some circumstances, especially when federal law plays a significant role. 
The market for publicly held unincorporated firms suggests that 
policymakers should examine the general market for law.  Specifically, 
increased federal regulation of firm governance might loosen Delaware’s 
dominance by reducing the advantages to firms of Delaware’s courts and 
laws.  If so, the competition for state business association law will grow 
more robust even as it becomes less consequential.  On the other hand, 
Delaware’s apparent ability to compete even under these more con-
strained circumstances suggests that Delaware may have competitive ad-
vantages that remain unappreciated because of the traditional narrow fo-
cus on the market for public corporation law. 
D. Europe 
Recent European developments show how the IAD can emerge in a 
context that differs significantly from the early history of the U.S. corpo-
ration.  This helps refute the historical explanation for corporate unique-
ness.  Although Europe has long applied the so-called “real seat” rule, 
pursuant to which the governing law is that of the country where the 
firm’s administrative office is located, recent European case law has 
adopted a version of the IAD.  European corporate law can therefore 
further test the effect of the IAD and its relationship to the general law 
market. 
 
 186. See National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts, The REIT Story, 
http://investinreits.com/learn/reitstory.cfm (last visited Jan. 5, 2008).  REITs are actually corporations 
formed under a special section of the Maryland Corporations and Associations Code, §§ 8-101 to 8-
801.  However, Maryland REITs share features with unincorporated firms.  See Larry E. Ribstein, The 
Rise of the Uncorporation (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
 187. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (2000). 
 188. See I.R.C. § 856 (2000) (providing rules for qualification of REITs for pass-through taxa-
tion). 
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The big break in the European market came in 1999 with the Cen-
tros case,189 in which the European Court of Justice (ECJ) held that 
Denmark could not bar a United Kingdom (UK) corporation from open-
ing a “branch” in Denmark merely because the corporation had never 
done business in the UK.  The company relied on the “right of estab-
lishment” in what is now Article 48 of the Treaty of Rome, which pro-
vides that companies formed in accordance with member state law shall 
“be treated in the same way as natural persons who are nationals of 
Member States.”190  The ECJ held that this protection was available even 
if the company simply wanted the more favorable law of the incorpora-
tion jurisdiction, rather than having some other business purpose for ex-
panding from its home base.191  The same court later held that denying a 
Dutch corporation the right to sue in Germany because its real seat was 
in the Netherlands was contrary to the right of establishment.192  This cast 
doubt on the survival in Europe of the real seat rule.  A third case held 
that the right of establishment in Article 48 not only trumped a prohibi-
tion on local registration, as in Centros, but also barred the Netherlands 
from imposing local regulations on a company that was based locally but 
incorporated elsewhere solely in order to avoid these regulations.193  In 
general, these cases clarified that the European Union (EU) constitution 
protects full-fledged Delaware-type charter competition for “tramp” or, 
in European parlance, “brass plate” corporations.194 
Centros and other cases evidently have provoked at least some 
European competition in the form of “tramp” UK incorporations by 
companies based elsewhere in Europe, as well as responses by other 
European countries, particularly by revising their minimum capitaliza-
tion requirements and simplifying incorporation requirements.195  But 
 
 189. Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. I-1459. 
 190. Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 8, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (c340) 3 [here-
inafter E.C. Treaty]. 
 191. See Centros, 1999 E.C.R. at I-1497–I-1498. 
 192. Case C-208/00, Überseering BV v. Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH 
(NCC), 2002 E.C.R. I-9919. 
 193. Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd., 
2003 E.C.R. 1-10155. 
 194. European countries can still inhibit jurisdictional competition if justified “on grounds of pub-
lic policy, public security or public health” under Article 46 of the Treaty of Rome.  E.C. Treaty, supra 
note 190, art 46.  Countries can also regulate outside of company law, such as by imposing legal capital 
type regulation under insolvency laws.  See John Armour, Who Should Make Corporate Law? EC 
Legislation versus Regulatory Competition (ECGI-Law Working Paper No. 54/2005, 2005), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=860444.  They can also inhibit firms’ ability to reincorporate in other coun-
tries, which would be a real constraint on the charter market.  See Case 81/87, The Queen.  H.M. 
Treasury and Comm’rs of Inland Revenue, ex parte Daily Mail and General Trust PLC, 1988 E.C.R. 
5483 on the interpretation of Articles 52 and 58 of the EEC Treaty and the provisions of Council Di-
rective 73/148 of 21 May 1973 on the abolition of restrictions on movement and residence within the 
Community for nationals of Member States with regard to establishment and the provision of services 
(holding that the right of establishment did not prevent the UK from blocking transfer of a company’s 
headquarters to another country to keep the company from avoiding payment of capital gains tax). 
 195. Marco Becht et al., Where Do Firms Incorporate? Deregulation and the Cost of Entry 23 
(Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 70, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
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competition under Europe’s version of the IAD so far seems to be fol-
lowing a different track from the United States.  European firms form in 
the UK not because of its law or courts but simply because it is a cheaper 
place to incorporate.196  The UK tramp firms are not the big Fortune 500-
type companies that Delaware specializes in, but smaller companies for 
which incorporation costs are significant.  These firms arguably do not 
need law as much as they need cheap recognition.  Thus, Europe is ar-
guably not yet a market for law in same sense as the U.S. corporate law 
market. 
Europe may or may not be poised on the brink of becoming a full-
scale corporate-type law market, as was the U.S. more than a century ago 
when New Jersey began to attract “tramp” corporations.  There are at 
least three significant impediments in Europe to U.S.-style charter com-
petition.  First, differences in law, language, and custom among Euro-
pean Community (EC) countries transcend any in the United States.  
Firms accordingly would find it difficult to operate in one country while 
litigating in another country, or under another country’s law.197 
Second, as would be expected from legislation at the level of the na-
tion rather than a small state like Delaware, interest groups are likely to 
interject their concerns into corporate law.  In particular, labor’s partici-
pation on corporate boards, or “codetermination,” remains a contentious 
issue in some European countries. 
Third, and most importantly, it is not clear whether any country has 
the incentive to become the European “Delaware”—the active driver of 
EC charter competition.198  The EC limits a country’s gains from charter-
ing fees and taxes.199  Even if European law allowed member countries to 
profit from such fees, it is unlikely any European country could earn 
enough fees to have the sort of incentive Delaware gets from the combi-
nation of its small size and dominant position in the competition.200  Al-
though the UK is emerging as the leader in tramp incorporations, so far 
it has made no significant changes in its law in order to attract incorpora-
 
906066 found an increase in UK incorporations of firms not physically located in the UK, mostly com-
ing from other EU countries subject to the Centros rule.  Specifically, they found that the average 
number of European private limited companies incorporating in the U.K. increased from 4,600 firms 
per year before Centros to 28,000 firms per year afterward, totaling over 120,000 firms between 1997 
and 2006, including 48,000 from Germany. 
 196. See id. 
 197. See, e.g., Martin Gelter, The Structure of Regulatory Competition in European Corporate  
Law, 5 J. CORP. L. STUD. 247 (2005) (discussing use of UK corporations in Germany and the Nether-
lands). 
 198. See id. at 257–62; Töbias Hans Troger, Choice of Jurisdiction in European Corporate Law—
Perspectives of European Corporate Governance, 6 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 3, 63 (2005); Marco Ven-
toruzzo, ‘Cost-Based’ and ‘Rule-Based’ Regulatory Competition: Markets  for Corporate Charters in the 
U.S. and in the EU, 3 N.Y.U.  J. L. & BUS. 91, 130 (2006). 
 199. See Council Directive Concerning Indirect Taxes on the Raising of Capital 69/335, 1968–1969 
O.J. Spec. Eo. (1249) 25 (EEC).  For analyses of the significance of this restrictions, see Armour, supra 
note 194; Gelter, supra note 197; Kamar, supra note 150. 
 200. See Gelter, supra note 197 at 253–62.  Note that Liechtenstein is not subject to the limitation 
on charter fees, but it competes mainly as a tax haven rather than for incorporations. 
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tions.  Europe therefore may test the importance of franchise fees in de-
veloping a U.S.-style charter market. 
On the other hand, some believe that U.S.-style competition might 
eventually break out in Europe, with England probably playing the role 
of Delaware.201  Firms may come to demand not just cheaper incorpora-
tion, but also flexible laws and expert judges.  In particular, the UK has 
delegated much of its securities law to responsive private lawmaking by 
the London Stock Exchange.  As with the corporate and other law mar-
ket competition, lawyers may heavily influence the supply side of the 
European corporate law market.  It is as misleading in Europe as in the 
United States to focus on franchise taxes and incorporation fees as a 
main driver of the law market.  The “charmed circle” of leading interna-
tional UK law firms acts as an intermediary in the corporate law market, 
and therefore can attract European corporations to the UK.  As in 
Delaware, the lawyers are likely to influence UK law to compete for 
chartering business. 
Indeed, one factor favors the emergence of an even more active law 
market in Europe than in the United States: the relative inability of the 
EC to effectively replace member-state corporate law.  Mark Roe theo-
rizes that the ever-present threat of federal regulation constrains U.S. 
corporate competition.202  This is less a problem in Europe since the EC 
regulatory apparatus is exceedingly slow and cumbersome.  Europe’s re-
cent moves toward the IAD reflect at least partly the central govern-
ment’s failure to harmonize corporate governance.  So even if European 
countries themselves have weaker incentives to compete to supply cor-
porate law—and this is not clear given the rise of the UK—this weakness 
might be offset by a weaker federal constraint on competition.203 
In general, although Europe has different competitive conditions 
than the United States: the same basic principles prevail in both contexts.  
Legislators in both systems seek to regulate corporate governance just as 
they do other types of contracts.  However, firms are mobile, and the UK 
has catered to this market, at least to the extent of lowering incorpora-
tion costs for small firms.  Moreover, European countries’ efforts to 
block this competition provoked a federal response.  In Europe, this re-
sponse so far has been in favor of choice of law, in the form of the ECJ’s 
decision in Centros, rather than federal corporate law regulations.  
Europe may move closer to the United States based on the same forces 
that have been important in the United States, particularly including the 
role of lawyers. 
On the other hand, if European jurisdictional competition continues 
to develop along a different track from the United States, it is important 
to emphasize that this will occur despite the existence of a choice-of-law 
 
 201. See Armour, supra note 194, at 29–32. 
 202. See supra text accompanying note 135. 
 203. See Gelter, supra note 197, at 265–69. 
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rule for corporate governance similar to the U.S. IAD.  This tends to re-
fute the notion that the U.S. corporate law market is attributable to the 
IAD and the unique circumstances of its birth.  Any differences between 
the United States and the EU will not be because different forces are at 
work, but because the specific environment affects the strength of each 
of these forces—the demand for regulation (i.e., firms’ mobility because 
of different local conditions), the supply of regulation (i.e., the local bar), 
and the resistance of local proregulatory interest groups (i.e., labor). 
E. International Securities Regulation 
International securities regulation seems far removed from the IAD 
because it operates on the national level rather than within a federal sys-
tem like the United States or Europe.  However, recent developments in 
international securities regulation show that forces similar to those oper-
ating on corporate law within federal systems are also operating on in-
ternational securities laws.  Although federal securities laws arguably cir-
cumvent the IAD by displacing state law,204 there is a market in 
international securities regulation that displays some of the same com-
petitive processes as the market for state corporate law.  Indeed, the in-
ternational market for securities regulations threatens continued domi-
nance of the U.S. federal role in securities regulation. 
One example of the influence of jurisdictional competition involves 
issuers (in particular Lloyd’s of London) selling securities to U.S. inves-
tors and inserting clauses in their stock sale agreements choosing English 
law and forum.  Federal securities statutes specifically prohibit issuers 
from attempting to contract around U.S. securities laws,205 so one might 
predict that U.S. courts would treat the securities laws as super-
mandatory rules.  Nevertheless, these clauses have generally been en-
forced.206  Congress, of course, could further tighten the securities laws to 
provide that choice-of-law clauses in securities sales agreements are un-
enforceable.  However, it is unlikely to do so because the demand side of 
the market, particularly including the ability to resort to arbitration, 
would likely significantly reduce the impact of any regulation that Con-
gress feasibly could impose.  Moreover, on the supply side, interest 
 
 204. See supra Part III.C. 
 205. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (2000) (“Any condition, stipulation, or provision 
binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter 
or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be void.”); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 
U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (2000) (“Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compli-
ance with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder, or of any rule of an 
exchange required thereby shall be void.”). 
 206. See Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 148 F.3d 1285, 1291–95 (11th Cir. 1998); 
Richards v. Lloyd’s of London, 135 F.3d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1998); Haynsworth v. The Corp., 121 F.3d 
956, 969 (5th Cir. 1997); Allen v. Lloyd’s of London, 94 F.3d 923, 929 (4th Cir. 1996); Bonny v. Society 
of Lloyd’s, 3 F.3d 156, 161–62 (7th Cir. 1993); Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd’s, 996 F.2d 1353, 1361–65 (2d 
Cir. 1993); Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 969 F.2d 953, 957 (10th Cir. 1992). 
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groups in the United States may have an incentive to preserve access by 
individual U.S. investors to overseas offerings, and choice-of-law and 
court or arbitration clauses may be necessary to preserve that access. 
Another route to jurisdictional competition in securities regulation 
is through the cross-listing market—that is, the listing of firms on securi-
ties exchanges outside their home country.  The demand side of this 
market consists of firms that seek to “bond” their disclosures by willingly 
subjecting themselves to tight U.S. disclosure standards and fraud 
rules.207  On the supply side, interest groups in cross-listing countries, in-
cluding lawyers, accountants, and investment bankers, get significant 
benefits from cross-listing and therefore incur costs if cross-listings dry 
up.  This law market is quite competitive, since cross-listing firms can 
fairly easily avoid the United States and stay home or go to other capital 
markets like London if the cross-listing country raises the cost or lowers 
the benefit of its regulation.  All of this was brought home with a thud 
when foreign companies started avoiding the United States after the 
adoption of stringent new regulation in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.208  For 
example, while in 1999 and 2000, foreign IPOs on U.S. exchanges raised 
ten times the amount raised in London, in 2005 London exchanges raised 
over $4 billion more than U.S. exchanges.209 
The cross-listing market is not strictly comparable to the IAD be-
cause cross-listing issuers are subject to both home country and U.S. law.  
However, competition for cross-listings might lead to a more conven-
tional type of law market in which firms can select a single regulator 
rather than exposing themselves to burdens imposed by multiple regula-
tors.  The U.S. interest groups affected by the exodus of cross-listers have 
pressured Congress and the SEC to wholly or partially exempt foreign 
issuers from U.S. law.210  Exempting foreign issuers from U.S. laws could 
make U.S.-based issuers wonder why they should have to compete in 
their own market for capital at a disadvantage to foreigners.  They may 
have the political clout to demand the same ability to opt out of U.S. 
regulations.  And if both U.S. and foreign firms can trade in the United 
States under a foreign country’s law, why not under a state’s law?  After 
all, U.S. investors probably would be more protected under state law be-
cause it would be easier for them to litigate in Delaware than in, say, 
Lichtenstein.  Thus, regulation and nonenforcement of contractual 
choice of law create an incentive to leave, and exit activates local indus-
tries that depend on the exiting firms.  This, in turn, pressures politicians 
 
 207. See Ribstein, Dabit, Preemption, and Choice of Law, supra note 130, at 167. 
 208. See Ribstein, Cross-Listing and Regulatory Competition, supra note 130, at 124–29.  For re-
cent data on the effect of Sarbanes-Oxley on the cross-listing market, see the Interim Report of the 
Committee on Capital Markets Regulation (Dec. 5, 2006), available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/ 
pdfs/11.30Committee_Interim_ReportREV2.pdf. 
 209. Roberta S. Karmel, NYSE-Euronext Merger: NYSE is Losing Listings to Foreign Exchanges, 
N.Y.L.J., Aug. 17, 2006, at 3. 
 210. See Ribstein, Cross-Listing and Regulatory Competition, supra note 130, at 119. 
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to enable jurisdictional choice, sometimes even for immobile locals.  In 
short, the elements of the law market story apply in the international 
context. 
F. The Market for Commercial Contracts 
The notion of the uniqueness of the corporate law market is further 
undermined by its similarity to the market for some non-corporate-
governance contracts.  Eisenberg and Miller have shown that New York 
has a significant share of the general choice-of-law market for commer-
cial contracts,211 although Delaware also occupies a leading role in this 
market as well.  Their review of several hundred merger and acquisition 
contracts, a context similar to the governance contracts covered by the 
IAD, found that while Delaware was the place of incorporation for 189 
of the merged corporations, only 132 chose Delaware law for the merger 
agreement.212  By contrast, there were only eight New York corporations 
in the set, but forty-five contracted for New York law in the merger 
agreement.  Thus, although Delaware has managed to figure prominently 
in this market even in the absence of the IAD, it falls short of its domi-
nance in the corporate market. 
There is a possible connection between this market for noncorpo-
rate law and the one for public corporation law.  As discussed in subpart 
A, there is a “home bias” in the corporate competition—publicly held 
firms tend to incorporate either in Delaware or in their home states.213  
Similarly, Eisenberg and Miller found that when Delaware corporations 
do not choose Delaware law for their merger contracts they often choose 
the state where the business is located.214  These firms may be doing so 
partly because linking the firm’s physical location with the designated 
law will make it more likely that the choice-of-law clause will be en-
forced.215  Firms that incorporate at home rather than in Delaware may 
have a related objective.  Incorporation might be viewed as a contact that 
increases the chance that the non-chosen state courts216 will apply the 
chosen state’s noncorporate law in otherwise close cases.  For example, if 
a plaintiff consumer resides in a state with a strong pro-consumer law 
such as California, the decision whether to enforce the choice-of-law 
clause designating, say, New York, might turn on whether New York was 
 
 211. See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 24. 
 212. See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 25, at 1982. 
 213. See supra text accompanying note 158. 
 214. See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 25, at 1988–2001. 
 215. Although these are large commercial contracts for which many commercial jurisdictions have 
abandoned a connection requirement, establishing a connection with the designated state may help 
promote enforcement in cases brought outside the designated state.  See supra Part I.D. 
 216. The designated state may not require a connection with itself because it is a major commer-
cial jurisdiction whose lawyers want to attract commercial litigation to the state.  See supra Part I.D.  
However, another state may require such a connection in order to limit the ease with which firms can 
avoid its laws. 
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the defendant’s state of incorporation.  Also, in a large international 
transaction that is likely to be adjudicated in the U.S., but where the par-
ties have a strong preference for non-U.S. law, a U.S. court may be more 
likely to apply foreign law if the relevant firm is also incorporated in the 
foreign country.  For example, consider Nedlloyd Lines B.V. v. Superior 
Court217 which involved an international multiparty shareholders’ agree-
ment to buy a Hong Kong corporation’s shares and operate the firm as a 
joint venture.  The California court enforced the contract’s choice of 
Hong Kong law, relying substantially on the fact that the subject firm was 
incorporated in Hong Kong.218  Even if the state-of-incorporation factor 
in enforcement is not large, firms that engage in repeated transactions in 
which these issues arise will want to maximize the likelihood of success 
over the range of cases. 
This analysis provides a further indication that, rather than being in-
sulated from noncorporate choice of law, the corporate law market is ac-
tually related to it.  Although Delaware has no national competitor for 
choice of law, it must compete at the local level with states that attract 
connections for general choice-of-law purposes.  The relevance of firms’ 
connections with states may lead firms to incorporate in states other than 
Delaware.  Delaware has to maintain its general lawmaking excellence in 
order to compete in this broader market.  To be sure, this explanation for 
the home bias is speculative at this point.  But the data at least suggests 
yet another advantage of viewing the competition for corporate law from 
the perspective of the broader law market rather than as a unique phe-
nomenon. 
G. Trusts 
Trust law is another area of the market for unincorporated con-
tracts that resembles the corporate law market even without the IAD.  
Trusts can designate the applicable law in the trust instrument, but this 
designation is subject to general choice-of-law rules requiring some con-
nection between the trust and the designated state.219  Recently, however, 
trust law has been subject to a competition that resembles what has hap-
pened in public corporation law.220 
Again, the general forces of the law market explain what has hap-
pened.  The trust law market was spurred by the 1986 change in tax law 
that allowed people to use trusts to make tax-free intergenerational 
wealth transfers while avoiding gift and inheritance taxes.221  However, 
settlors had to contend with the Rule Against Perpetuities (RAP), which 
 
 217. 834 P.2d 1148 (Cal. 1992). 
 218. See id. at 1153, 1155–56. 
 219. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS §§ 270, 272 (1971). 
 220. See Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds: 
An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356, 416–17 (2005). 
 221. See id. at 370–72 (discussing tax changes and their effect on trust competition). 
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invalidates restrictions on property, particularly including in trust in-
struments,222 effective for long than the life of anyone alive at the time of 
the transfer (a “life in being”) plus 21 years.  The new tax benefit of per-
petual trusts created a demand to free trusts of the RAP and, in turn, a 
competition for trust funds.  Delaware was first to see the opportunity 
and abolished the RAP in 1995, explicitly acknowledging the intent to 
participate in a competition for trust law, and several states followed suit 
over the next three years.223 
This state competition is particularly interesting for present pur-
poses because of why states were willing to supply the perpetual trust 
market.  One might think that states wanted to levy taxes on the trust as-
sets, analogous to the standard franchise tax explanation for the corpo-
rate charter competition.  But Sitkoff and Schanzenbach convincingly re-
fute this explanation by showing that trust assets increased after the 
abolition of RAP only in the states that did not tax trusts they attracted 
from out of state.224  This is not surprising, because as long as some states 
did not charge tax, settlors establishing trusts in states other than where 
they live would, all else equal, choose a state that did not charge the tax. 
The puzzle is on the supply side: why would states participate in the 
competition even if they were not reaping tax revenues?  The important 
beneficiaries of the competition for trust law turned out to be lawyers, as 
well as bankers who earn significant fees from organizing and managing 
trusts.  States abolishing the RAP attracted $100 billion in additional 
trust assets, which based on standard fee schedules translates into about 
$1 billion a year in trustees’ commissions.225  Lawyers undoubtedly 
earned significant fees from forming and managing trusts.226 
In short, the competition for trusts is another example of the forces 
at work throughout the law market: party mobility drives the demand 
side and exit-affected interest groups (especially including lawyers) drive 
the supply side.  The result of this law market competition is significant 
changes in the underlying law. 
H. Summary 
This Part confirms the implications of Parts I–III: the corporate law 
market is not a unique phenomenon, but rather one component of the 
 
 222. See id. at 366 n.26 (noting that “[t]oday, because almost all life estates and future interests 
are created in trust rather than as legal interests, the Rule’s primary modern application is to interests 
in trusts funded with stocks, bonds, and other liquid financial assets”). 
 223. See id. at 376. 
 224. Id. at 386, 394–98. 
 225. Id. at 410–11. 
 226. Note that the corporate franchise tax “bonds” Delaware to continue to provide high-quality 
law.  See supra text accompanying note 90.  Accordingly, it might seem that the absence of a tax moti-
vation for state trust law might lead to lower quality law.  However, it is probably the case that trust 
law does not require the same sort of continuous updating that is important for corporate law, so 
bonding future performance is less necessary. 
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overall market for law.  The market for public corporation law is actually 
not overwhelmingly dominated by Delaware.  Rather, Delaware has only 
about half the market, while the other states are successfully competing 
for the other half, arguably because of factors relating to the general law 
market.  Moreover, the markets for closely held firms, publicly held un-
incorporated firms, and European firms all exhibit different characteris-
tics although the IAD applies to all of them.  At the same time, the mar-
ket for international securities regulation, commercial contracts, and 
trusts looks similar to that for public corporations despite the fact that 
the IAD does not apply to that market.  In short, the idea of a unique 
market for corporate law does not stand up to a more general analysis of 
the markets for business associations and other laws.  Rather, the differ-
ences are best explained by differences in the relative strengths of the 
same forces underlying the law market generally: demand-side mobility, 
supply-side competition motivated by exit-affected interest groups, and 
constraints imposed by proregulatory groups at the state and federal lev-
els. 
V. IMPLICATIONS 
This article shows that the IAD and the market for corporate law 
are not attributable to unique features of corporations, but rather are 
specific applications of the general forces that apply to contracting for 
law.  Firms have the same reasons for choosing the law that applies to 
their governance that they do for choosing the applicable law in other 
contexts.  The IAD does not spring from the unique history of corporate 
law.  As in other contexts, courts enforce contracts choosing corporate 
governance law despite their erosion of states’ power to regulate because 
refusal to do so may cause corporations to avoid making investments in 
regulating states, which would harm local interest groups, or might trig-
ger a federal reaction in order to protect the operation of multistate 
firms.  The corporate law market therefore involves the same tension be-
tween proregulatory, antiregulatory, and exit-affected interest groups 
that underlies contractual choice of law in other contexts.  Indeed, the 
congruence of the corporate and general law markets is further indicated 
by the facts that many different business associations are covered by the 
same choice-of-law rule, and that contracts covered by a different choice-
of-law rule have choice-of-law features similar to those found under the 
IAD. 
This Part explores some legal and policy implications of our insight.  
Subpart A argues that the law market lens undermines claims that the 
IAD should be given constitutional status.  Subpart B discusses the im-
plications for the debate on the contractual nature of the corporation.  
Subparts C and D discuss how this article’s analysis helps settle conflicts 
between state and federal law, and among state corporate laws.  Subpart 
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E summarizes some general implications of the analysis for future schol-
arship. 
A. Constitutional Protection of the IAD 
An implication of the historical explanation of the corporate law 
market is the notion that courts are constitutionally compelled to apply 
the IAD.  After all, if corporations owe their existence and allegiance to 
the state that created them, presumably other states are constrained to 
apply that state’s law.  However, the IAD never has been entitled to con-
stitutional protection, including during the period when the IAD was de-
veloped.  It is even clearer that no such protection exists today to account 
for the continued viability of the rule. 
Three constitutional provisions are relevant.  The Full Faith and 
Credit Clause empowers Congress to decide the respect that each U.S. 
state must give to other states’ laws.227  The Due Process Clause228 implic-
itly guarantees to the parties minimal standards of fairness in litigation, 
including the right to be protected from unfair surprise regarding the 
governing law.  Finally, the Commerce Clause229 empowers Congress to 
regulate interstate commerce, and in its “negative” form prevents states 
from usurping the federal role by enacting regulations that unreasonably 
interfere with interstate commerce.230 
The Court has approached, without quite reaching the result of, giv-
ing the IAD constitutional status under the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause.231  Most of the cases involved members of fraternal benefit asso-
ciations who joined a local lodge and agreed to pay periodic assessments 
to the national organization.  Because the organization agreed to make 
payments to the member’s family when the member died, it functioned 
as a nonprofit insurer.  When a member or beneficiary made claims 
against the organization, the Court consistently held that the member’s 
rights must be determined according to the organization’s formation 
state law.  Because members paid assessments into a common fund, the 
Court deemed it important to the success of the organization that the 
 
 227. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public 
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws 
prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect 
thereof.”). 
 228. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law . . . .”). 
 229. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (providing that Congress has the power “[t]o regulate com-
merce . . . among the several States . . . .”). 
 230. The Equal Protection and Privileges and Immunities Clauses arguably also constrain choice-
of-law approaches that discriminate in favor of state residents or against out-of-state residents.  How-
ever, the Privileges and Immunities Clause applies only to persons, not entities, and the Equal Protec-
tion Clause has never been used to strike a state’s choice-of-law policies.  We therefore do not con-
sider these clauses in our analysis. 
 231. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
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members have uniform rights to the proceeds of the fund.232  This need 
for a single governing law seems particularly compelling in a case like 
Supreme Council of the Royal Arcanum v. Green,233 where the law of the 
state of the organization’s formation was held to control an issue regard-
ing members’ assessments.  Obviously it would be very hard for the or-
ganization to operate effectively when members’ contributions are sub-
ject to different rules in each state.  But the rule was also applied in less 
exigent circumstances such as Order of United Commercial Travelers v. 
Wolfe,234 where a notice-of-claim provision in the association’s constitu-
tion was enforced despite a law in the member’s state of residence invali-
dating contractual shortening of the limitations period.  Surely differing 
limitations periods would have interfered with the day to day operations 
of the Order. 
The Court, however, has never applied these formation-state cases 
to a business corporation.  It came closest in Broderick v. Rosner,235 which 
held that New Jersey could not prevent a New York bank from suing its 
New Jersey shareholders under New York law.  The Court, citing a fra-
ternal benefit association case, said that “the act of becoming a member 
(of a corporation) is something more than a contract, it is entering into a 
complex and abiding relation, and as marriage looks to domicile, mem-
bership looks to and must be governed by the law of the State granting 
the incorporation.”236 
But the Broderick case involved whether New Jersey could thwart 
an assessment by a New York official, which was akin to a court order 
and therefore specifically covered by the Full Faith and Credit Clause.  
This leaves open the question whether a New Jersey court would have 
been required to enter a judgment consistent with New York law if there 
had been no prior court order equivalent in New York. 
Whatever the constitutional support for the IAD before the mid-
1930s, this support is much weaker now after Allstate Insurance Co v. 
Hague237 has effectively merged Full Faith and Credit and Due Process 
for choice-of-law purposes.238  In Hague, the Court let Minnesota apply 
its rule “stacking” uninsured motorist coverage for three vehicles owned 
by an insured rather than the different rule in Wisconsin.  The Minnesota 
 
 232. Order of United Commercial Travelors of Am. v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586, 614 (1947). 
 233. 237 U.S. 531, 546 (1915). 
 234. 331 U.S. 586, 624–25 (1947).  For similar cases, see Sovereign Camp of Woodmen of the 
World v. Bolin, 305 U.S. 66, 78 (1938) (enforcing bylaw providing that member’s obligations would 
cease after twenty years against claim that bylaw was ultra vires); Sovereign Camp, 305 U.S. at 78–79 
(authority of society to forgive member assessments after 20 years to be determined according to law 
where the society was formed); Modern Woodmen of America v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544, 551 (1925) (en-
forcing bylaw concerning effect of member’s prolonged absence rather than presumption-of-death 
law). 
 235. 294 U.S. 629, 643–44 (1935). 
 236. Id. (citing Modern Woodmen, 267 U.S. at 551). 
 237. 449 U.S. 302, 320 (1981). 
 238. Id. at 308 n.10. 
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rule applied although the policy was issued and the insured resided in 
Wisconsin because the decedent worked in Minnesota, his widow be-
came a Minnesota resident after the accident, and the insurer was doing 
business in Minnesota.  The majority thought there was “no element of 
unfair surprise or frustration of legitimate expectations as a result of 
Minnesota’s choice of its law.”239  Justice Stevens, concurring, said that 
the parties’ expectations are significant under the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause,240 and suggested that the Due Process Clause would raise fairness 
concerns if the parties had made their expectations explicit by providing 
for application of a particular law.241  In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts242 
the Court applied this expectations test in refusing to allow a Kansas 
court to apply forum state law in a nationwide class action, reasoning 
that because some of the leases had nothing to do with the State of Kan-
sas, the parties did not expect the forum’s law to control when they exe-
cuted the leases.243 
These cases indicate that the constitutionality of a choice-of-law 
rule depends on whether parties should anticipate at the time of the 
transaction that the law of any state with a connection to that transaction 
might apply.  If a state attempts to apply wholly unrelated law to that 
transaction, as Kansas did in Shutts, then the Court may strike down that 
choice on Full Faith and Credit and Due Process grounds.  Although 
these clauses protect the parties against arbitrary choices of law, they 
would not compel enforcement of choice-of-law clauses.  A constitution-
ally mandated IAD is similarly unlikely. 
The Commerce Clause provides an alternative constitutional basis 
for the IAD. Because the Clause most clearly prevents only overt dis-
crimination against interstate commerce,244 one might think it clearly 
would not prevent a state from applying the same law to a foreign corpo-
ration that it applies to its own firms.  But the Court also has used the 
Clause to protect against a state’s imposing costs on parties in other 
states by effectively regulating interstate commerce.  For example, the 
Court struck down state regulation of the length of interstate trains,245 
and trucks,246 and an Illinois law requiring a type of mudguard that dif-
fered from the type permitted in forty-five states and required in at least 
one.247  Forcing trucks to change mudguards at the state line obviously 
 
 239. Id. at 318 n.24. 
 240. Id. at 324 n.11. 
 241. Id. at 328–29. 
 242. 472 U.S. 797 (1985). 
 243. Id. at 822. 
 244. See Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1092 (1986) (suggesting that the Court should 
merely prevent states from engaging in purposeful economic protectionism). 
 245. See S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 781–82 (1945). 
 246. See Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 678–79 (1981); Raymond Motor 
Trans., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 447–48 (1978). 
 247. See Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 529–30 (1959). 
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inhibits interstate commerce.  Closer to the IAD, in Edgar v. Mite 
Corp.,248 a plurality of the Court applied this principle to invalidate an Il-
linois law that regulated national tender offers to shareholders residing in 
Illinois.249  By contrast, the Court held in CTS Corp. v Dynamics Corp. of 
America,250 that the Commerce Clause supported the application of the 
IAD to allow Indiana to regulate a tender offer for control of an Indiana 
corporation.251 
These cases seem to suggest that the Commerce Clause permits only 
the state of incorporation to regulate corporate governance.  The su-
preme court of Delaware—the state that has the most to gain from the 
IAD—thinks that the IAD is therefore constitutionally protected.252  
California courts disagree, upholding the constitutionality of the state’s 
“outreach” statute regulating the internal governance of firms with sig-
nificant California contacts.253  The statute provides that California law 
controls a number of internal governance issues if a foreign company 
conducts at least half of its business in California and California residents 
hold at least fifty percent of the company’s voting securities.254 
California has the better argument.  The Court has never held that 
the Commerce Clause precludes a state from regulating the internal gov-
ernance of a firm incorporated under another state’s law.  Violations of 
the IAD often can, but do not necessarily, involve the sort of insuperable 
multiple-regulation problem that demands Commerce Clause attention.  
As a California court noted in applying the California statute to a Utah 
corporation, given the significant presence in California that was neces-
sary to trigger the statute, it is unlikely more than one such state law 
would apply to a given corporation.255  So while the Commerce Clause 
might bar some corporate statutes that force firms to comply with multi-
ple states’ laws, this does not elevate the IAD to special constitutional 
status. 
The strongest argument for the constitutional status of the IAD is 
based on the Court’s use of Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Wood-
ward.256  There the Court held that the Contract Clause257 invalidated a 
New Hampshire statute that altered the terms of a British crown charter 
 
 248. 457 U.S. 624 (1982). 
 249. Id. at 640–43. 
 250. 481 U.S. 69 (1980). 
 251. Id. at 91–94. 
 252. See Vantagepoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108, 1116 (Del. 2005); 
McDermott, Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 218–19 (Del. 1987); Timothy P. Glynn, Delaware’s Vantage-
point: The Empire Strikes Back in the Post-Post-Enron Era 4–5 (Seton Hall Pub. Law & Legal Re-
search Series, Working Paper No. 2007-001), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=966449 (criticizing 
Delaware’s assertion of the constitutional basis of the IAD). 
 253. See Wilson v. La.-Pac. Res., Inc., 187 Cal. Rptr. 852 (Ct. App. 1982). 
 254. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115 (West 1990). 
 255. Wilson, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 859–60. 
 256. 17 U.S. 518 (1819). 
 257. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (providing that “[n]o State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing 
the Obligation of Contract”). 
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granted to Dartmouth College because the charter was a contract.  CTS 
cited Dartmouth College in reasoning that “no principle of corporation 
law and practice is more firmly established than a State’s authority to 
regulate domestic corporations, including the authority to define the vot-
ing rights of shareholders.”258  However, while this reasoning permits a 
state to regulate the internal affairs of its own corporations, it still does 
not necessarily follow that only the incorporating state can do so. 
The IAD might have quasi-constitutional status as a limit on the 
reach of federal law through the Supremacy Clause.  As discussed above, 
CTS emphasized the incorporating state’s special province over corpo-
rate governance.  Conversely, when the Court held that state securities 
actions were preempted by the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards 
Act, it reasoned that “[t]he magnitude of the federal interest in protect-
ing the integrity and efficient operation of the market for nationally 
traded securities cannot be overstated.”259  But the Court seems to be dis-
tinguishing between “securities” and “internal governance” issues rather 
than endorsing the IAD.  Many federal “securities” laws reach deep into 
the kind of internal governance issues covered by the IAD, including the 
Williams Act, which regulates takeovers, the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act, which imposes the first internal controls reporting in the wake of the 
corporate bribery scandals of the 1970’s, and, of course, the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002.260 
Thus, while the Commerce Clause suggests that the Court might 
impose some order on the states, such order does not necessarily have to 
be achieved with the IAD.  At most, the IAD helps mark out an area 
that is relatively safe from federal preemption.  But this is only a sugges-
tion rather than a constitutional boundary, as shown by the continuing 
forward march of federal corporation law. 
The important question for present purposes is whether the Court 
should follow the implication of cases like CTS and use the Commerce 
Clause (or perhaps Full Faith and Credit/Due Process) to forbid a state 
from imposing its corporate law on a foreign corporation.  This result 
cannot be based on the notion that multiple state laws would excessively 
burden interstate firms because although it is necessary for only one state 
law to apply, that state need not be the incorporating state.  Even if the 
incorporating state has the best claim to applying its law, this claim does 
not necessarily deserve constitutional protection. 
 
 258. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987). 
 259. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 78 (2006); see Ribstein, 
Dabit, Preemption, and Choice of Law, supra note 130, at 160–65 (analyzing the case and its preemp-
tion issue). 
 260. For discussions of the increasing federalization of state corporate law, see Robert B. Ahdieh, 
From “Federalization” to “Mixed Governance” in Corporate Law: A Defense of Sarbanes-Oxley, 53 
BUFF. L. REV. 721 (2005); Renee M. Jones, Does Federalism Matter? Its Perplexing Role in the Corpo-
rate Governance Debate, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 879 (2006); Mark J. Loewenstein, The Supreme 
Court, Rule 10b-5 and the Federalization of Corporate Law, 39 IND. L. REV. 17 (2006). 
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The law market perspective contributes to this analysis.  First, it 
shows that Commerce Clause protection may not be necessary because 
of the role of party mobility and exit-affected interest groups discussed in 
this article.  Because this mobility was enough to enable the IAD to de-
velop without any direct constitutional support, it is not clear why the 
constitution would be necessary to bolster it now. 
Second, this article shows that the IAD has no stronger policy basis 
than other rules for enforcing choice-of-law clauses.  Thus, if the IAD 
has constitutional status, so should rules enforcing choice-of-law clauses 
in other types of contracts.  For example, if the IAD has constitutional 
status, why not insist on the enforcement of clauses designating the ap-
plicable law in franchise, insurance, consumer, or employment agree-
ments—all agreements where courts are inclined to invoke the “funda-
mental policy” exceptions under general choice-of-law rules?261  While 
there are distinctions between these contracts and those dealing with 
corporate governance, the question is whether these distinctions rise to a 
constitutional dimension.  Given the close connections between the cor-
porate and general law markets discussed in this paper, there is no obvi-
ous way the Court could carve out a distinctly “corporate” area for con-
stitutional protection.  It would then have to immerse itself in state 
choice-of-law jurisprudence, a move it took up but quickly abandoned at 
the beginning of the 20th century. 
B. The Corporation as Contract 
The law market has broad implications for how the government 
should approach regulating corporate governance.  Since the inception of 
the modern publicly held corporation, there has been a lively debate be-
tween those who view the corporation as a political entity, consistent 
with its origins as a state-created franchise, and those who view it as the 
product of private contract.262  An important basis for the state-creation 
position is that corporations are the beneficiaries of a choice-of-law rule 
that allows them to choose any state’s law for their corporate govern-
ance.  This state-created privilege seems to justify exacting the price of 
greater susceptibility to regulation than other contractual relationships. 
We have seen, however, that the IAD does not give Delaware 
courts power over corporations’ worldwide activities.  Rather, this article 
shows that the IAD is a relatively narrow doctrine that leaves plenty of 
room for regulation by the states in which corporations carry on their ac-
tivities.  It follows that the IAD not only does not need to be justified by 
a political theory, but also does not itself confer a special privilege that 
should make the corporation, in effect, a ward of the state. 
 
 261. See supra text accompanying note 116. 
 262. See supra note 14. 
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The relationship between the corporate law market and contractual 
choice of law generally is also significant in deciding how the IAD should 
be applied. Consider, for example, Rosenmiller v. Bordes,263 where the 
court applied Delaware law to a Delaware corporation despite a New 
Jersey choice-of-law clause in the firm’s shareholder agreement.  Be-
cause the IAD is only a rule for enforcing contractual choice of law, it 
arguably should be interpreted like any other choice-of-law clause—that 
is, consistent with the contracting parties’ expectations.  Incorporating in 
Delaware arguably indicates the parties’ intent to apply Delaware law to 
all corporate-governance-related matters notwithstanding a contrary 
choice-of-law clause in the shareholder agreement.  Or one might argue 
to the contrary that the later agreement trumps the earlier Delaware in-
corporation. 
Even if the corporation is simply a contract, the state has the power 
to regulate it, just as it does other contracts.  From this standpoint, the 
law market analysis provides a rationale for regulating corporate choice 
of law.  Thus, the Rosenmiller result might be explained in terms of the 
law market processes discussed in this article.  The Delaware court might 
have been attempting to avoid creating a precedent that would enable 
other states to undermine Delaware’s investment in corporate law.  
Delaware needs supply side incentives in order to produce high quality 
law.  Delaware arguably can protect its significant investment in its cor-
porate law “infrastructure” only if it can restrict the privilege of using 
Delaware law in Delaware courts to Delaware corporations, which have 
paid the full incorporation fee.  This suggests that Delaware would hesi-
tate to let parties circumvent the fee by incorporating elsewhere and 
agreeing to apply Delaware law.264  In so regulating contractual choice of 
law, Delaware would be protecting Delaware policy—in this case, its pol-
icy protecting Delaware’s investment in its corporate infrastructure.  This 
is not fundamentally different from any state’s refusing to enforce a 
choice-of-law clause in order to prevent evasion of local policy. 
C. State or Federal Law? 
As discussed in subpart A, the Court has cited states’ power over in-
ternal corporate governance as a basis for refusing to preempt state-of-
incorporation takeover regulation.  Under the traditional analysis, states 
have special rights over internal governance, while the federal govern-
ment regulates the securities markets.  But this is an artificial distinction.  
As a matter of policy it is far from clear why the federal government 
 
 263. 607 A.2d 465, 468–69 (Del. Ch. 1991). 
 264. See Ribstein, supra note 76, at 1022–25. 
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should not regulate internal corporate governance, which obviously af-
fects the national securities markets.265 
The law market lens provides a clearer view of this policy issue.  
The application of federal law to corporate or other contracts should de-
pend at least in part on whether the IAD or other rule on contractual 
choice of law is a viable alternative.  As long as a state regulates only 
firms that choose its law, state law probably does not impose the sort of 
burdens that require federal relief.  Just as the Court need not protect 
the IAD under the “negative” version of the Commerce Clause, so Con-
gress need not act under its positive Commerce Clause power.  By con-
trast, when a nonincorporating state seeks to regulate corporate govern-
ance, there is a risk of multiple state regulations that may justify federal 
preemption.  Note that this argument applies to any matter covered by 
incorporating state law, and not just those matters traditionally covered 
by the IAD.  It follows that a state should be concerned about triggering 
federal preemption only when it trumps the IAD or other contractual 
choice of law, and not when it seeks to expand the matters covered by 
the IAD or other choice-of-law contracts. 
Federal law theoretically could solve the problem of state nonappli-
cation of the IAD not by displacing these laws, but alternatively by pro-
viding for federal enforcement of contractual choice.  A possible mecha-
nism for federal intervention into enforcing contractual choice of law 
could be through a law preempting state laws on corporate governance 
or securities except to the extent that it is subject to the IAD.  Congress 
used a similar approach in the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards 
Act, which prohibited state law actions for securities fraud.266  The Act 
exempted from preemption certain state disclosure actions that are cur-
rently governed by state corporate law.267  Congress might have adopted 
the approach suggested here simply by extending the “carve-out” to any 
action that is governed by the IAD.268 
The analysis so far in this section focuses on the risk of state over-
regulation by disregarding contractual choice.  Federal intervention 
theoretically also may be warranted if there is evidence of underregula-
tion, or a race-to-the-bottom, from state court enforcement of the IAD.  
This depends, among other things, on whether states are vigorously com-
peting to provide corporate law, or whether, instead, Delaware domi-
nates the market.  In fact, Delaware’s dominance is far from clear, given 
 
 265. See Ahdieh, supra note 260, at 741–45; Donald C. Langevoort, Federalism in Corpo-
rate/Securities Law: Reflections on Delaware, California, and State Regulation of Insider Trading, 40 
U.S.F. L. REV. 879, 890–91 (2006). 
 266. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b) (2000); id. § 78bb(f)(1). 
 267. Id. § 77p(d)(1); id. § 78bb(f)(3)(a). 
 268. See Ribstein, Dabit, Preemption, and Choice of Law, supra note 130, at 165–71 (suggesting 
this approach). 
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substantial evidence that home jurisdictions compete to keep local firms 
from incorporating in Delaware.269 
Although we cannot here settle the race-to-the-bottom debate, we 
can at least suggest that there is a policy basis for distinguishing between 
federal preemption when the state courts do not respect contractual 
choice of law and preemption when state courts do respect contractual 
choice.  In the former case, federal intervention often may be necessary 
to protect against significant interstate spillovers.  In this situation state 
competition has broken down to the extent that single states are able to 
regulate national firms.  That will be the case whenever national firms in 
interstate commerce cannot cheaply avoid state contacts that enable 
states to regulate. 
On the other hand, when the states respect choice-of-law contracts 
or the IAD, a market for law theoretically can operate in which the states 
have incentives to meet the needs of all contracting parties.  To be sure, 
contractual choice is not always desirable: these contracts may be im-
paired by bargaining defects or may impose costs on non-contracting par-
ties.  But the states have an opportunity to impose super-mandatory rules 
within the constraints of law market processes, including the “shadow” of 
potential federal preemption discussed above.270  Given these checks, the 
race-to-the-bottom seems to be a lower priority risk than the risk of po-
tential spillovers when states go outside the bounds of contractual choice.  
This analysis suggests that the federal government should follow a policy 
of presuming against preemption whenever there is a functioning law 
market in the sense that the states generally enforce contractual choice of 
law.  That would certainly be the case for corporate law given the IAD. 
The analysis in this subpart suggests that while states might be con-
cerned that underregulation would trigger a federal response, they need 
not have this concern from regulating unless in doing so they also refuse 
to enforce contractual choice of law.  Some recent cases in which Dela-
ware courts have hesitated in expanding the scope of Delaware corporate 
law into the federal preserve of securities regulation indicate that Dela-
ware has misperceived the nature of the federal preemption threat.  The 
Delaware Supreme Court initially held in Malone v. Brincat271 that 
shareholders could sue directors for breach of fiduciary duty based on 
false financial statements in SEC reports and shareholder communica-
tions, even if the statements are not connected with corporate transac-
tions.  Delaware Chief Justice Steele was dubious about this theory when 
he decided Malone as Vice Chancellor, noting that 
Congress has articulated a standard of disclosure to protect the na-
tional securities market. It makes little sense for Delaware courts to 
impose either a duplicative or stricter standard on directors of 
 
 269. See supra Part IV.A. 
 270. See supra Part III.C. 
 271. 722 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998). 
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Delaware corporations.  Neither the Delaware corporation code 
nor the common law suggests that Delaware can or should pick up 
the perceived regulatory slack when federal scrutiny may not in-
clude review of every actionable theory divinable by a dogged 
plaintiff.272 
Vice Chancellor Leo Strine expressed a similar concern in holding 
against a Delaware remedy for insider trading.  Referring to the Securi-
ties Litigation Uniform Standards Act,273 he said that state regulation of 
insider trading “might . . . fuel further legislative developments, as what 
was understood by Congress to be a narrow and fixed ‘Delaware carve-
out’ for traditional fiduciary duty claims turns out to be an expanding ex-
cavation site that unsettles the structure of federal securities law.”274  In 
other words, a Delaware remedy for insider trading might invite more 
federal preemption of state law.  Professor Langevoort correctly sees 
Strine’s restraint as an attempt to maintain separate spheres for federal 
and state law.275 
The concern expressed in these cases is not warranted under this ar-
ticle’s analysis.  Congress has little reason to occupy a state law area just 
because Delaware has sought to provide greater protection in an area 
covered by federal law.  The appropriate scope of federal regulation 
should depend for corporate law, as for the law market generally, on the 
costs of leaving this matter to the states.  If the states can coordinate with 
each other by enforcing contractual choice of law, there may be little role 
for federal regulation.  Indeed, Delaware ought to have precisely the op-
posite concern: that doing nothing might trigger a federal response re-
gardless of whether such a response is appropriate.276 
D. Which State? The Limits of the IAD 
When should, and will, a state apply another state’s corporation law 
to locally based firms?  To see these issues, consider some recent Cali-
fornia cases.  One case indicated that California clearly feels bound by 
 
 272. Malone v. Brincat, No. 15510, 1997 WL 697940, at 2 (Del. Ch. Oct. 30, 1997), rev’d, 722 A.2d 
5 (Del. 1998). 
 273. See supra text accompanying note 266. 
 274. In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., No. Civ. A. 18751, 2004 WL 2756278, at *24 (Del. Ch. 
Dec. 2, 2004) (footnotes omitted). 
 275. See Langevoort, supra note 265. 
 276. One might argue that the federal government would be more likely to act in the face of state 
over-enforcement of contractual choice of law that resulted in neglecting interests that otherwise 
would be protected by state mandatory rules.  For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act might be seen as 
a reaction to the inadequacies of state corporation law under the IAD.  However, it is more accurate 
to view a law like SOX as a reaction to what Congress views as a mistake or inadequacy of substantive 
state law than as a reaction to a particular choice-of-law rule.  In other words, mistaken state policy 
rather than excessive state coordination is the basis for federal action.  Thus, if the IAD were less uni-
versally recognized—if, for example, California defected and imposed its own version of SOX—
Congress would more likely see this as a justification for acting than as undercutting the need to act.  
To the extent that a choice-of-law rule is a basis for Congressional action, the rejection of the IAD is 
more likely to call for federal action than its acceptance. 
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the IAD.  In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Superior 
Court,277 the court applied Illinois corporate law to determine the duty of 
directors of an Illinois mutual insurance company to pay dividends, rely-
ing on the IAD rather than the usual contract analysis under Second Re-
statement § 187. 
The California courts are, however, less sure about the scope of the 
rule.  Thus, a California appellate court held in Friese v. Superior Court278 
that a shareholders’ derivative action brought on the corporation’s behalf 
under the California securities law for insider trading was not barred by 
the fact that the incorporating state (Delaware) did not allow such a 
claim.  Meanwhile, a federal court held in In re Sagent Technology, Inc. 
Derivative Litigation279 that the IAD did apply to this type of claim.  And 
yet another California appellate court held in Grosset v. Wenaas280 that 
the incorporating state’s law trumped California’s requirement that de-
rivative plaintiffs hold their shares throughout the litigation, although 
recognizing the California requirement that plaintiff own shares at the 
time of the transaction would have applied. Grosset is now being re-
viewed by the California Supreme Court. 
The issue in these cases arguably does not concern the appropriate 
sphere of state internal governance regulation, but only what issues the 
incorporating state has actually sought to regulate.  Because the IAD is 
simply a contractual choice-of-law rule, a court need not decide whether 
the suit involves “securities trading” or “internal governance” in some 
fundamental sense.  Thus, if Delaware decides that shareholders should 
be able to sue their firms derivatively to recover an insider’s trading prof-
its, this constitutes a contract among the shareholders to apply Delaware 
law to these suits wherever they are brought and wherever the share-
holders and insiders reside.  This would also be the case if Delaware 
clearly has determined to provide a breach of fiduciary action for insider 
trading. 
California could, of course, decide to regulate Delaware corpora-
tions, including aspects that relate to internal governance, and thereby 
protect California residents.  As discussed in subpart A, the constitution 
would not preclude this regulation.  States arguably should be able to in-
validate choice-of-law contracts pursuant to a statute that clearly ex-
presses their intent to do so.281  Because the IAD is a contractual choice-
of-law rule, the same approach should apply to the IAD. 
 
 277. 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 56 (Ct. App. 2003). 
 278. 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 558 (Ct. App. 2005), cert. denied, Moores v. Friese, 127 S. Ct. 138 (Oct 02, 
2006). 
 279. 278 F. Supp. 2d 1079 (N.D. Cal. 2003). 
 280. 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d 58 (Ct. App. 2005), review granted and opinion superseded by Grosset v. 
Wennas, 127 P.3d 27 (Cal. 2006). 
 281. See O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 31, at 1199–1200 (proposing this rule for choice-of-law 
clauses). 
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The question, then, is when it would be appropriate for California 
to regulate a Delaware corporation.282  California might reasonably de-
cide that whether it trumps Delaware law depends on whether the matter 
relates to a central aspect of Delaware policy and expertise—that is, in-
ternal corporate governance rather than securities regulation.  On the 
other hand, California could decide that it wishes to impose its law 
whenever the potential harm to California residents is enough to justify 
California regulation.  The focus on internal governance impedes analy-
sis by forcing courts into awkward modes to rationalize their result.  
Rather than making an artificial distinction between internal governance 
and other issues, the California legislature should face the tough question 
of whether it wants to impose the regulation and act accordingly. 
If several states regulating Delaware corporate insiders impose un-
due burdens on multistate firms, Congress may have to step in, just as it 
did when California’s nonderivative securities law liability provoked pas-
sage of the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act.283  Indeed, the 
securities laws generally could be viewed as a reaction to burdensome 
state securities regulation.  Although Congress did not preempt state law 
in 1933 or 1934, it did so in 1997 when California threatened to undercut 
Congress’s attempt to limit securities class actions.284  But whether Con-
gress should act depends on whether the states can coordinate without 
federal help by construing the scope of the IAD.  This article’s analysis 
suggests that the law market can constrain aggressive state action in 
many cases without aggressive federal intervention. 
E. Implications for Future Scholarship 
This article has important implications for studying jurisdictional 
competition.  Instead of focusing on a specific subset of contracts relating 
to the governance of publicly held corporations, the appropriate perspec-
tive is the general market for law.  Indeed, there are different submarkets 
for a continuum of different types of contracts, including business-
 
 282. There is a separate question as to whether and under what circumstances a state other than 
Delaware may adjudicate governance issues under Delaware law.  Delaware judges have refused to 
stay or dismiss actions in Delaware in the face of related suits involving the same firm filed in other 
jurisdictions.  See In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 2007 No. Civ. A. 2786-UCS, WL 1412990 (Del. Ch. 
May 9, 2007); Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341 (Del. Ch. 2007).  Both courts rely heavily on Delaware 
courts’ interest and expertise in maintaining the quality of Delaware law, particularly in cases involv-
ing novel questions of law.  Clearly this would be a strong consideration supporting enforcement in 
Delaware or New York of a provision designating a Delaware forum either in the corporate charter or 
as a statutory default rule.  But it is not clear what the Delaware courts should do in the unlikely event 
that the parties entered into a choice-of-forum clause explicitly choosing a New York court.  Perhaps 
Delaware should be able to protect its investment in its law by refusing to enforce the clause.  On the 
other hand, enforcement of this contract would enable the law market to exert discipline on Delaware 
courts. 
 283. See supra text accompanying note 259. 
 284. See Joshua D. Ratner, Stockholders’ Holding Claim Class Actions Under State Law After the 
Uniform Standards Act of 1998, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1035, 1042–51 (2001). 
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association-type contracts.  Future work should continue exploring these 
differences and similarities.  This article has suggested some issues that 
are ripe for analysis.  For example, why is there a single dominant player 
in the market for public corporations, but an oligopoly in the market for 
noncorporate commercial contracts?  What explains Florida’s evident 
success in the market for closely held firms?  Why have non-Delaware 
states, particularly Maryland, succeeded in dominating the market for 
some publicly held unincorporated firms?  What explains when a particu-
lar state will compete in the law market, and the nature of the competi-
tion it engages in?  What types of laws are susceptible to being “traded” 
in the market for law? 
These issues are important to understanding the role of state law in 
an increasingly globalizing world.  When even the smallest e-commerce 
firms have broad international networks of suppliers and customers, state 
law seems to be increasingly an anachronism.  Yet giving law-making 
functions to a single lawmaker eliminates exit as a constraint on subop-
timal laws, and reduces experimentation and diversity at a time when 
these features are increasingly necessary.  The corporate law market, in 
which party choice is generally enforced subject to reserving the power 
to states and countries to enact explicitly super-mandatory rules, points 
the way toward accommodating local law with a global economy. 
F. Summary 
This Part has examined some implications of the law market per-
spective.  First, the scope of constitutional protection for the IAD de-
pends directly on the relationship between the IAD and the general law 
market: the closer this relationship, the weaker the argument for giving 
special protection to corporate choice of law.  Moreover, the competitive 
forces underlying the law market, which among other things were re-
sponsible for the birth of the IAD even in the absence of constitutional 
protection, indicate that constitutional protection may not be necessary. 
Second, the close relationship between the corporate law market 
and the general market for law supports the characterization of the cor-
poration as a contract.  The IAD is not a special privilege accorded cor-
porations because of their origin as state-conferred concessions.  It is 
rather an application of the same forces that underlie other aspects of the 
law market. 
Third, the law market analysis bears on the dividing line between 
state and federal law.  Clearly there is no sharp distinction between “cor-
porate” and “securities” law.  But this does not tell us where the divide 
should be, and even less that federal law should encroach even further on 
the state domain.  The law market analysis instructs that federal law is 
necessary, and indeed has been used, mainly as a fallback when the states 
have failed to enforce contractual choice of law.  Thus, the division be-
tween state and federal law does not depend on whether Delaware seeks 
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to regulate securities, but on whether California is willing to respect that 
regulation. 
This analysis obviously carries over to the question of the extent to 
which states should be able to regulate firms whose governance is subject 
to the law of another state.  Again, the answer does not depend on a 
sharp divide between “corporate” and other law, for the simple reason 
that there is no unique market for corporate law.  As in other aspects of 
the law market, Delaware makes its own decision about the extent to 
which it seeks to regulate corporations, while California makes its deci-
sion about the extent to which it will respect Delaware law.  The IAD as 
currently configured is important only because it has been generally suc-
cessful as a coordinating mechanism.  In other words, the states have 
been willing to respect other states’ laws as long as they stay within the 
relatively innocuous confines of the IAD rather than intruding on policy 
concerns the states care more about.  But this does not mean that there is 
a hard and fast policy distinction between the issues that are within, and 
those that are outside, the IAD. 
Finally, the law market analysis has important implications for fu-
ture scholarship.  This article has indicated several issues on which more 
research is appropriate concerning the nature of the law market.  There 
are many other potential illustrations of the advantages of escaping the 
intellectual rut of the supposedly unique market for corporate law. 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The IAD and the market for corporate law have been studied as 
unique phenomena.  In fact, these topics need to be understood within 
the context of the general market for law.  There are important connec-
tions between choice of law for corporations and contractual choice of 
law in other settings.  These include not only the commercial contracts 
examined for comparison in this article, but also domestic relations,285 
property,286 securities regulation,287 bankruptcy,288 and electronic com-
merce.289  As with the IAD, understanding the general policies and poli-
tics underlying the law market can produce useful insights into jurisdic-
tional competition, with important implications for such topics as 
constitutional law and the nature of the corporation. 
 
 285. See F.H. Buckley & Larry E. Ribstein, Calling a Truce in the Marriage Wars, 2001 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 561. 
 286. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchmovsky, Of Property and Federalism, 115 YALE L.J. 72 
(2005). 
 287. See Romano, Empowering Investors, supra note 130. 
 288. See Robert R. Rasmussen, Resolving Transnational Insolvencies Through Private Ordering, 
98 MICH. L. REV. 2252 (2000). 
 289. See Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, State Regulation of Electronic Commerce, 51 
EMORY L.J. 1 (2002). 
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